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The Ideology of Stadium Construction seeks to define the application of 
community power in the process of building sports stadiums.  Using data culled from a 
literature review, this project examines the recent construction of sports venues and the 
political, economic, and social ideas driving their proliferation.  A three dimensional 
approach to applied power provides a theoretical tool to illustrate and analyze the 
blueprint of stadium construction.  Taking a more broad view of the culture of business 
in the United States suggests the public funding of stadium construction arching 
towards Antonio Gramsci’s sense of hegemony.   Beyond attempting to merely define 
the political process driving stadium construction as a significant social problem, this 
project introduces potential alternatives to the organizational method currently in 
place.   
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Prologue:  A Primer on Stadium Construction:  The Public’s Policy?  
 
Experiencing a steady upward trajectory in cost, frequency, and physical 
footprint over the past generation, the construction of new sports venues constantly 
occurs all around us.  The increasing popularity and participation in the institution of 
sport corresponds with the escalating financial burden in producing these facilities.  The 
responsibility for funding these venues became muddled and perpetually undefined, 
eventually relying more heavily on local taxpayers to foot all or a significant portion of 
the bill.  Socially normalized over time, a history of documented success provides a 
fertile training ground for enterprising executives hoping to score access to the 
community treasury.  Those deriving status, wealth, and power internalize successful 
tactics, choosing when appropriate to apply these oft-repeated public policy schemes.  
Concurrently, debt service on several demolished and abandoned sports cathedrals still 
exist in several communities (Appendix A and B).   
A pre-defined moment in time exists when the public debate over funding the 
next bigger and better stadium commences.  Epitomizing the development cycle of 
stadiums, architectural trending provides a means to better understand this constantly 
evolving process.  Modern, “retro” styled architecture attempt to emulate facilities 
previously demolished, including the emotional attachment older fans my experience 
with these long disappeared facilities.  However, fans visiting historically significant 
sports venues will undoubtedly note environmental differences.  The “real” retro 
experience lacks prominent luxury seating options and larger concourses maximizing 
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corporate advertising and retail opportunity.  Architectural tastes and the demands of 
the sports business will continue evolving, further replicating this cyclical process.  
The seeds of stadium growth projects, sowing from the wallets of the taxpayer, 
bloom into the mammoth brick and mortar buildings defining the contemporary 
American skyline.  Leveraging the success of this direct economic strategy by 
professional sports leagues, other organizations within the institution of sport have 
become accustomed to traveling to their statehouses to advocate for public dollars.  
Seemingly, broad state support for the sports industry appears limitless—motorsports, 
high school stadiums/gymnasiums, and minor-league, amateur, and niche professional 
sports including soccer and ice hockey all vying for their slice of the corporatized 
American Dream.  On occasion sports based legislation does fail, however, most of the 
time the sports business eventually receives the funding they seek in subsequent 
attempts. 
With the legislative success of the sports industry in obtaining public funding for 
infrastructure, from an organizational perspective, suggesting an alternative funding 
method implies an irrational error in judgement.  More basically, why would any 
business owner seek to pay for something themselves with another party willing to act 
in proxy?      
As with many of the riddles defining contemporary social problems, citizens most 
disproportionately affected through this type of public expenditure remain least able to 
resist its enactment.  Enduring sustained attacks on public education, the exploding 
costs of medicine, and shouldering the burden of regressive taxes, including sales and 
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services taxes funding stadiums, middle and working-class families pay a high-cost for 
the luxury of sports entertainment.  From a distance, it appears the sports industry 
expresses little respect for the individuals belonging to their fan base through refusing 
to resist the redistribution of community wealth.   
Those who follow sports closely seek out niche news and information.  The 
culture of sports provides a marketing platform for educating a wide audience of 
consumers about potential new stadium projects, interspersed with other sports scores 
and news stories.  Pro-stadium construction arguments found in these media sources 
appear compelling on the surface.  Fans willing to pay their hard-earned money to 
attend a game should experience the most comfortable amenities available.  Stadium 
construction projects create jobs and potentially contribute to the vitality of specific 
areas within the community.  Economic development surrounding stadium projects may 
materialize in the future.  Access to professional sports teams allows for elected officials 
to project a “big city” image.  Most important to the general fan, the financial 
commitment to the team solidifies their immediate future.   
For many years, with little critical thought on the topic, I found myself generally 
supportive of stadium construction proposals.  I would look forward to visiting new 
venues when they opened.  The construction of Lucas Oil Stadium, a short walk from my 
campus in Indianapolis, corresponded with my increasing interest in sociology.  The 
literature I considered through this course of study provided me with the training to 
consider social, political, and economic questions and ideas through a more critical lens.  
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Specifically, the literature I confronted in preparation for this project profoundly 
impacted the perspective I present in the following pages. 
Broadly, this project seeks to define how stadium building projects advance from 
simple ideas on an executive’s note pad through the process of becoming brick-and-
mortar reality.  Exploring the process of applying social power to initiative, protect, and 
finalize stadium proposals provides a more full understanding of the ideology driving 
this phenomenon.  Opening the public coffers with every request from the sports 
industry, the burden of producing sports stadiums has transitioned into a readily 
acceptable use of state power (Appendix C).  With four more venues projected to open 
over the next two years in the top three spectator sports and countless others 
throughout the rest of the professional and amateur sporting apparatus, this subject will 
remain critical for communities weighing the merits of stadium construction projects 
(Appendix D).   
 
Studying Stadium Construction – Economic Outcomes and Political Processes   
Cataloguing available research on the public funding of sports stadiums, Rick 
Eckstein and Kevin Delaney describe two broad themes of research (2007).  The first 
school of thought embraces a thorough statistical analysis determining the financial 
efficacy of large-scale public investment in sports stadiums.  These studies have 
produced a near unanimous volume of literature suggesting public financing of sports 
venues do not justify the use of increasingly scarce public funding (Delaney and Eckstein 
2007).  The substantial benefits supplied by local governments in the process of building 
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stadiums cannot be economically justified, as the direct beneficiaries are specifically 
team owners and players, not the community or taxpayer (Baade 1996).  This collection 
of quantitative research has yet to show signs of slowing or disrupting legislation 
allocating public funding for private stadiums.   
The second, less prolific theme, details the political processes driving the 
construction of sports facilities (Eckstein and Delaney 2007).  The role of political 
processes within social events provides the critical link between understanding social 
action and social structure (Abrams 1982:7).  Taking this perspective, we can begin to 
approach “sports as an independent institution, that reflects and legitimates broader 
social inequalities of wealth, power and prestige,” (Eckstein, Moss, and Delaney 
2010:503).  While in the minority of sports sociology research, several excellent studies 
examining political decisions have commenced, including Delaney and Eckstein’s Public 
Dollars, Private Stadiums: Battles Over Building Stadiums (2003), Costas Spirou and Larry 
Bennett’s It’s Hardly Sportin’: Stadiums, Neighborhoods, and the New Chicago (2003), 
Robert C. Trumpbour’s The New Cathedrals: Politics and Media in the History of Stadium 
Construction (2007), and Neil de Mausse and Joanna Cagan’s The Field of Schemes:  How 
the Great Stadium Swindle Turns Public Money into Private Profit (2008).  Contributing 
thoughtful analysis, each of these projects focuses on local developments following 
sports teams seeking tax dollars for new stadiums.  Regardless of the specified research 
orientation, the sheer depth of existing literature reinforces the notion of stadium 
construction as a significant community event and critical research subject. 
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Figuring prominently in the research on the construction of sports stadiums, case 
studies allow for the closer investigation of these two themes.  Nevertheless, advancing 
the observed gap between efficacy and process studies, I will forego the use of this 
method.  By taking a step back from conducting a case study, I will instead work toward 
defining the collective ideas propelling the process of providing taxpayer funding for the 
construction of sports stadiums and the ideology supporting this economically unsound 
behavior.  Working through this project, I will provide specific attention to the method 
by which certain ideas are purposely nurtured in the hearts and minds of Americans.  
Regardless, data collected from case studies have greatly influenced my understanding 
of this topic and subsequently provided the intellectual engine behind this literature 
review.   
Advancing through this project, I draw upon research originating through the 
study of history, economics, public policy, political science, and most often, sociology.  
While considering a wide range of interdisciplinary research, I will specifically rely on the 
methods of historical sociology.  Devoted to gaining a full understanding of the nature 
and effect of large-scale structures and processes of social change, this tradition 
concentrates on a broader view of how historical events contribute to the modern social 
condition (Skocpol 1982:4).  With their own distinct methods, the study of history and 
sociology may seem vividly conflicting.  Victoria Bonnell’s essay on The Uses of Theory, 
Concepts, and Comparison in Historical Sociology succinctly outlines general differences 
(1980).  Sociologists accept deductive reasoning, embracing the use of secondary 
sources within their analysis, where historians work toward incorporating primary 
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sources leading to their interpretations.  Sociologists begin with their theory, allowing 
for the possibility to exist their hypothesis could be proven false.  Historians appear 
more apprehensive in their willingness to take on projects using a comparative analysis 
across national borders and across extended eras.  Sociologists prefer a broader 
approach to their research, maintaining large-scale trending impossible to analyze 
during short time spans. 
With the surface tension between the two disciplines, accepting both 
orientations appears virtually impossible.  This inherent conflict drove both disciplines to 
create niches within, accepting their individual discipline’s methodological assumptions.  
For the sociologist, understanding historical contexts and pressures which contribute to 
the present reality of any given society is critical.  Connecting social theory to specific 
historical events and narratives occurs logically.  This connection provides an efficient 
method of sketching a coherent explanation of the development of specific social 
occurrences and facts.  “Historical sociology is not just some special kind of sociology, it 
is the essence of the discipline,” explains Phillip Abrams, just “try asking serious 
questions about the contemporary world and see if you can do it without historical 
answers,” (1982:1-2).  
 
The Four Themes of Stadium Construction:  Hegemony, Trojan Horses, Shock Doctrines, 
and Celebration Capitalism 
Before advancing any further, I must clarify my thoughts and objectives in using 
the term ideology.  I am simply referring to the dominant pattern of ideas governing 
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thought and action throughout society.  Extending beyond a mildly interesting research 
subject, ideology can determine life and death under specific circumstances (Zinn 1991).  
In geopolitical terms, the existence of two opposing political ideologies provided fuel for 
spurring on the Cold War.  The Ideology of Stadium Construction exists without a 
cohesive, organized interlocutor.  Regardless of resistance, once the dominant ideology 
begins transitioning to unquestioned fact among thought leaders and prominent 
citizens, the process of hegemony starts playing out.  
Researching Brazil’s preparation to host the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics 
in 2016, Dave Zirin illuminates two ideological themes surrounding publicly financed 
stadiums (2014).  Presenting on stadium construction in Brazil, his ideas remain equally 
valid in assessing the ideas propelling the construction of sporting venues in the United 
States.  First, Zirin defines publicly funded stadium construction projects act as “neo-
liberal Trojan horses.”  After granting public acceptance for such projects and the public 
money transferred to private hands, the hidden costs begin to appear in dizzying 
proportions.  Occurring in both the international sporting events of Zirin’s attention and 
those in the U.S., the hidden costs of these projects are rarely discussed, including the 
use of public dollars for infrastructure improvements around the stadium.  Additionally, 
financing structures of these projects, extending years into the future, rarely arise 
during the community discussion of stadiums. 
Drawing on Naomi Klein’s 2007 book The Shock Doctrine, Zirin crafts the second 
theme he explores.  Through a significant community event, usually with tragic 
underpinnings, a given population becomes softened up and subsequently less resistant 
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to economic decisions generally disregarded by the majority.  Describing this process 
Klein explains these, “orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of 
catastrophic events, combined with the treatment of disasters as exciting market 
opportunities,” (2007:6).  Tweaking this concept slightly, Jules Boykoff refers to the 
public funding of sports stadiums as “celebration capitalism,” a more specific 
description of the euphoric celebration following the announcement of international 
sporting events or new sports venues (2014).   
More specifically, these thinkers describe distinct moments on the timeline of 
stadium construction.  Zirin and Boykoff both elicit strong logic in their assessment, 
regardless of semantic differences.  The waning euphoria disappears, economic 
promises remain left unfulfilled, and the totality of the bill becomes visible.  After 
continued financing of these venues becomes burdensome, the manufactured economic 
crises rise to the surface.  The reaction of politicians in the United States concerning this 
phenomenon mimics the reaction of those who have bought into this ideology abroad, 
austerity—the wholesale and widespread attack on public goods and social services.   
 
Public Policy – The Intellectual Machinery of Progress and Growth  
Bad economic principles do not appear out of thin air, they become enacted 
through the passage of public policy.  Any study of a specific public policy, such as this 
one, must begin by reviewing the manner in which the policy is suggested, debated, and 
formed.  Elite economic institutions and organizations, such as the World Economic 
Forum, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, play a significant role in 
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shaping and passing public policy, reports G. William Domhoff (1970).  Presenting 
specific initiatives at conferences such as the annual World Economic Forum gathering 
at Davos, Switzerland, these organizations hold distinct sway over economic thinkers.  
Back home, corporate-financed think tanks employing academic experts serve to 
package and distribute ideas to political leaders (i.e. Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, 
Center for American Progress, and the Brookings Institute).  Elite foundations such as 
the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations fund social research likely to provide 
results supporting their ideology (Seybold 1982).   
Most significantly for Domhoff, members of these aforementioned institutions 
serve on “blue-ribbon commissions” or “task forces” articulating the policy 
recommendations amenable to elite and corporate interests to the public. By selecting 
members likely to provide a favorable position to corporate interests, these 
commissioners work under the guise of bipartisanship. 
Convening to recommend methods to lower the national debt, the Simpson-
Bowles Commission exists as an example of one of the most recent policy 
recommending commissions.  Their recommendations included lowering revenue in the 
form of reducing both income and corporate tax rates, while simultaneously increasing 
the retirement age and reducing Social Security benefits (National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform).  The idea of the national debt becoming a crisis leads to 
political attacks on the most vulnerable populations.   
Allowing a greater level of financial freedom for the wealthy could encourage 
greater levels of local economic investment and thereby create jobs, the commissioners 
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argued.  The lack of stipulations requiring those receiving economic benefit from 
reinvesting accumulated wealth back into the economic system for “trickle-down” to 
occur, illustrates a significant breakdown in the tax cuts as an economic stimulant 
philosophy.  Economic elites may just hold on to their money, instead of investing and 
enjoy the fruits of their wealth through conspicuous consumption.   
These policies are designed to assist and support those with the ability to 
nurture their existence from simple ideas all the way through the process of becoming 
written law.  Pocketing the money and enjoying the fruits of being situated on the right 
side of the economic divide provides much incentive for those rigging the economic 
system to favor themselves and their associates.  Superbly defining the relationship 
between the working class, the elite and the manifestation of public policy, Thomas 
Frank writes “when one gains wealth through the direction of social, economic, and 
political policy, the other is sent into belt tightening mode,” (2005:45).  Learning to 
transfer their own private troubles regarding their business and corporate interests to 
the public arena, we may refer to this as the sociological imagination of corporate 
persons.  Clearly not the mark Mills aimed, empowering the most economically 
powerful at the expense of the majority.      
Even though municipalities face the prospect of an overall net loss if they choose 
to maintain professional sports, Mark Rosentraub and David Swindell demonstrate the 
public has the opportunity to accomplish some goals through focusing their negotiation 
strategy (2009).  The potential for mitigating some financial loss exists through 
organized strategies, such as attempting to focus economic benefit to specifically 
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targeted areas, maximizing potential tax revenue, and seeking to coax the greatest level 
of intangible benefits related to the imagery and idea of being a “major league” city.  
Rosentraub and Swindell suggest the only real option available to cities focuses on the 
pursuit of a public/private partnership with local sports franchises (2009).  This public 
negotiation model implies no alternative.  Choosing to ignore the whims of the 
billionaires may otherwise lead teams to entering “free agency” and subsequently 
testing their ability to secure public dollars from another location.  Free-agent franchises 
place the “home” of a team on the free-market, searching for the best location-based 
incentives for their business.   
Locally justifying the public investment in private growth projects assumes the 
most probable form. Framing benefits towards satisfying the needs and goals of the 
specific community in question remains an efficient tactic of the new stadium 
movement.  Varying and numerous, the most prevalent of these tactics argues in favor 
of a neoliberal economic culture promoting centralized, urban growth to increase local 
revenue.  Maintaining sustained growth, supporters argue, grows the local tax base and 
increases economic opportunity for all those willing to reach out and invest.  Assisting in 
communicating these economic ideas to Americans, metaphorical and visual cues such 
as “a rising tide lifts all boats,” “morning in America,” and “trickle-down economics” 
elicit and maintain a base for providing public funds for privately owned growth 
projects.  With the scientific community continually suggesting the alternative, these 
misleading value-free phrases provide additional support for such ideas.     
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One of the most interesting questions concerning the process of stadium 
construction seeks to understand how public funding proposals continue achieving 
public policy success.  Local growth coalition theory provides a beneficial theoretical 
lens to understand how consent for this policy coalesces at the local level (Delaney and 
Eckstein 2007).  The central issue for those with the ability to provide “the resources to 
make their caring felt as a political force” centers on the formation of a climate of 
sustained economic growth (Molotch 1976: 310).  Pro-growth advocacy organizations 
support policy preferences with their checkbooks.  For sports stadiums built in the 
modern era, a united class of community elites and their ability to mobilize growth 
coalition activities positively influences the potential for stadium proposal achieving 
success (Paul and Brown 2001).   
Access to the front door of the political machinery supplies a key to attaining a 
voice in the policy debate.  Schattsneider defined the political or pressure system as 
having “an upper-class bias.”   (1975:32).  Growing more distinctly visible in the years 
since Schattsneider conducted his study, upper class bias cannot be traced to one event, 
individual, or corporation but rather the strength of ideology. The uneven recovery 
following the 2007 financial collapse and the Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission Supreme Court decision exponentially strengthened the upper-class bias of 
the pressure system.  Manifesting through public policy, upper-class bias creates an 
economic atmosphere where those with the greatest level of access to the political 
system shape rules in their own favor.   
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Aligning public policy toward economic growth and more specifically, the 
maintenance of a positive urban image to “sell the city” satisfies the goals of a very 
specific, narrow stratum of the community.  Approaching a more moral and egalitarian 
public policy for the needs and desires of the public, reflected in the diverse goods, 
products, and services shared amongst the entire population, should exist as the 
ultimate community goal.  Historically, municipalities maintain varying degrees of 
control over these special industries and services.  Existing among the most basic and 
important public services, communities cooperate together to manage the highway 
system, parks, education, and emergency services.  Utilities with a public interest should 
proceed with the public interest in mind.  Considering other privatized services, such as 
internet access, medical care, and professional sports should receive greater 
consideration for utility privilege.  Commodifying these shared goods directly results in 
providing opportunities for private industry through an economic system where the 
possession of wealth exists as a golden ticket to influencing the direction and scope of 
public policy decisions.    
 
The Ideology of Stadium Construction   
Eckstein, Dana Moss, and Delaney cite Pierre Bourdeau’s suggestion for 
examining how the sports industry displays values less devoted to the competition 
playing out and focusing more attention towards the industry’s drive to produce a shiny 
product for mass consumption and more significantly, mass profit (2010).  Accepting the 
sports industry as akin to any other industry represents a vital link in understanding the 
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motivation behind specific action.  Defining the business of the sports industry, as 
Bourdeau suggests, directs my work in the first chapter.  Specifically, I will detail cultural 
advantages benefiting the sports industry.  I plan to accomplish this task by creating an 
abbreviated review of recent American history detailing the advantages arising from the 
legal system, by the nature of the sport industry’s product, and the current prevailing 
economic ideology.   
Demonstrating public policy as a virtual carbon copy of the agenda of growth 
advocacy groups raises a more significant question.  How can a meaningful conversation 
or debate occur when the goals of both parties align nearly identically?  With each side 
seeking to attain as much of their preconceived goals as possible, the public negotiation 
model exists merely as a high stakes chess match.  Approaching team officials for a 
meeting, local politicians have already accepted the conclusion they will provide 
taxpayer dollars to keep the team and peripheral benefits in town.  Stadium proposals 
failing in the negotiation stage often represent a weak, non-cohesive local growth 
coalition failing to focus resource as a measure to attain the support of the community, 
rather than an ideological divide between the negotiating parties (Eckstein and Delaney 
2006).   
Groups favoring proposed stadium construction projects prefer discussions to 
remain outside of the community consciousness.  Once negotiations occur openly, 
predetermined policy prescriptions may no longer hold sway over communities.  Strong 
protest movements provide an avenue through which ordinary people can gain power 
and refocus policy conversations and direction (Piven 2006).  Particularly rankling some 
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in the community, the process of debating funding sports venues resembles the political 
systems in a plutocratic or oligarchic society, not a democracy (Lekakis 2014).  Residing 
at the center of this perceived negotiating table between municipal leaders and team 
owners lay the primary themes of power and control.  Examining power as a property to 
be accessed, possessed, and wielded by self-interested individuals and more specifically 
self-interested corporate individuals is the overarching goal of the second chapter.  A 
three-dimensional approach to interpreting applied power through the community 
debate over new sports venues will help develop a more full understanding of 
community power.  This approach assists in labeling and defining industry tactics which 
might not otherwise receive attention.   
Taking these themes in compilation, the historical precedence for establishing a 
pro-business social, economic, and political culture and combining the applied social 
power propelling public funding of sports stadiums, represents the essence of the  
 
Ideology of Stadium Construction.   
The final chapter will commence with a short discussion of the state of the 
stadium construction ideology in 2015.  A disturbing level of control in new stadium 
developments in Detroit and Atlanta has recently emerged.  The dominating posture of 
the professional sports industry appears on full display when stadium construction 
proposals remain under wraps until construction plans are complete and the community 
financing secure.  Concurrently, cities are achieving a more effective defensive strategy 
for countering the efforts of team representatives and league officials.  My final task 
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centers on achieving objectivity, which in a sociological sense requires a full review of all 
possible alternatives (Mills 2000).   
In completing this review process, ideas suppressed within the political system 
become more easily studied, defined, and debated.  Accepting the policy defined above 
has become the default public policy in municipal and state governments, but 
researchers should not consider this an inevitable policy and future economic decision 
may evolve (Delaney and Eckstein 2007).  Addressing the process of defining alternative 
organizational structures posing a viable solution to deficits through comparative 
analysis occurs in the third chapter.  In progressing through this project, a cohesive 
theory explaining why publicly funded stadiums continue appearing with increasing 
frequency will be developed.  By increasing the level of knowledge available to the 
public, the greater the community arsenal in combating a social process distinctly 
disadvantaging the economic fortunes of one economic class in favor of another.  
Devoting specific attention to barriers blocking the implementation of reform, it is my 
hope other scholars will join with me in advancing the literature on the presented 
alternatives. 
 
Fulfilling the Potential of Sports Sociology 
Explaining the hyper-construction of sports stadiums within the context of the 
economic, social, and political organization of the United States, the Ideology of Stadium 
Construction embodies my attempt to provide an analysis of how applied power drives 
the process of stadiums construction.  Witnessing the sports industrial complex’s ability 
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to capture the public policy apparatus through industry-related advantages leads one to 
question how far this process will extend.  Advancing beyond just simple labeling of this 
phenomenon as a social problem, this project attempts to initiate a discussion on 
potential organizational alternatives.  
Reflecting on sports sociologists’ inability to develop theory explaining macro-
sociological processes, Eckstein, Moss, and Delaney wrote a 2010 paper titled “Sports 
Sociology’s Still Untapped Potential.” Topics such as the funding and financing of youth, 
college, and professional sports, the interdependent relationship between the corporate 
media and sports franchises, and the connection between the institution of sport and 
the political system have yet to be fully developed in the academic literature.  
Representing an integral role in the Ideology of Stadium Construction, these 
interconnected themes garner support from a broad coalition of backers providing 
ideological cover for the transfer of public wealth to private pockets.  This process 
continues marching on without any sign of slowing—a direct affront to the scientists 
who have exposed this phenomenon as a sham, an illusion benefiting those with the 
greatest economic leverage.  
Benefiting from an interdisciplinary approach, relying on key concepts from 
sociology, as well as ideas originating in the study of economics, political science, and 
history, this project prominently develops themes in sports sociology.  Specifically, 
applying a three dimensional framework to study the application of power in the 
construction of sports stadiums provides a clear view of how stadium construction 
projects develop.  Taking on this project as a literature review strengthens this study by 
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allowing me to step back and benefit from the existing case studies.  From this starting 
point, I can present a series of general themes to interpret and define the Ideology of 
Stadium Construction.  Witnessing every method I will cover does not necessarily occur 
in each stadium construction project, therefore, using this method allows for a more 
complete analysis of the overall phenomenon.  This project contributes to the literature 
relating to stadium construction by labeling and defining the collection of ideas driving 
this phenomenon and more specifically inventorying and analyzing tactics used to apply 
pressure to communities to commit public dollars.  
Cases transferring ownership of sports teams provide a quantitative 
representation to the extent of financial success sports businesses have achieved.  Even 
with the astronomical financial values attached to sports teams, they still sell well above 
their market value, with members of the top economic strata lining up for the 
opportunity to enter this exclusive club.  Considering other trends affecting the value of 
sports teams, including media deals for television rights and corporate partner and 
sponsorship deals offer increasingly lucrative lines of profit, the value of teams should 
be rising. But, we must collectively ask ourselves how much longer committing taxpayer 
dollars to these wealthy organizations remains necessary for American communities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Ch#1 – Unmasking the Game: An Inventory of Industry Assets  
 
I know where I’m going and I know the truth and I don’t have to be what   
you want me to be.  I am free to be what I want.      
 —Cassius Clay (in 1964) 
 
In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth is a revolutionary act.  
 —George Orwell (1903-1950) 
 
If the past has nothing to say to the present, history may go on sleeping 
undisturbed in the closet where the system keeps its old disguises.    
 —Eduardo Galeano (1940-2015) 
 
Occupying a lofty position in American culture, the institution of sport takes 
place all around us—the professional games easily visible from every major city across 
the country, the footprint of youth sports central to every small town, and within our 
libraries, a nearly endless volume of literature on the subject.  Filling all of the National 
Football League (NFL) facilities requires the equivalent population of the fourth-largest 
city in the United States (n=2,258,430).  Beaming into Americans living rooms, every 
household with a cable package has access to the Entertainment and Sports 
Programming Network (ESPN) at a cost of around $5 per household (Stelter 2013).  
Generating upwards of $5 billion per year with participation numbers roughly 
equivalent to the population of Texas, the institution of little league sports exhibits the 
characteristics of big business (Kelly and Carchia 2013).  Beginning with middle school 
and running all the way through the top of the education system, sports teams 
comprising of the student body represent the institution.  Interlacing sports within 
religious organizations through church athletic leagues and fraternal organizations such 
as the Fellowship of Christian Athletes (FCA) or Athletes in Action (AIA) shows the 
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overlapping nature of sports and culture.  Claiming the institution pervasive throughout 
American society still seems somewhat an understatement.   
Clearly, the American public possesses a great interest in this institution.  
Resulting from collective passionate enthusiasm, the professional sports industry 
receives strategic assistance and protection through the institution’s central cultural 
location.  This assistance originates from various community sources, providing shape to 
the institution and industry we recognize today.  The cultural position of the institution 
of sport becomes critical when attempting to understand the business behind the game.  
We must consider the act of participating in commerce does not occur in a vacuum.  
Activity relating to business ownership takes place within the parameters debated and 
defined within the political system.  Extending to all specific and direct action, individual 
politics govern action in all facets of their lives, including through their ownership 
responsibilities (Weber 2004).  Failing to consider the socio-political culture of business 
and industry when attempting to understand the process behind how stadiums develop 
fails in drawing a complete portrait of this phenomenon.  If this project was seeking to 
understand why a specific species of tree grows in a given location, wouldn’t the 
environmental factors significantly contribute to the report?  Scientifically, considering 
the growth of brick and steel structures is similar to the growth of considering organic 
matter—environment matters.        
This chapter attempts to achieve a greater level of understanding relating to 
specific circumstances of preference for the institution and business of sports.  This 
process is simultaneously political and social. Arising from advantages provided through 
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the political system, as well as from members of the public who are wholly engrossed in 
the game playing out on the field.  Cheerful robots exhibit a blind allegiance to teams, 
owners, and to their own memories and emotions, consenting to the looting of the 
public coffers because of their greater interest in the spirit of competition.  Bringing to 
light the facts of the sports industry allows the reader to disassociate oneself from the 
product.  Combining together, these social processes provide the sports industry a 
special economic position unattainable by any other industry.   
 
The Heroic Free Market 
A subsection of American culture elevates the everyday action of participating in 
ownership activity to the levels of heroism.  During the 2012 Republican National 
Convention this notion was on full display as the phrase “we built that” was used ad 
nauseam.  Marginalizing the contributions others make to specific individual 
accomplishments, this catchphrase fails to exhibit an understanding of social location in 
exchange for a self-congratulatory pat on the back.   
The social origins of this philosophy, where the American ideal type of rugged 
individualism merges with a strict adherence to free-market principle will become 
clearer through this discussion.  Equivocating business activity with heroism originates 
“from an earlier age of laissez-faire, of epic individual efforts,” associated with the 
settlement of the Western United States (Trachtenberg  2007:228).  This philosophy 
does not advance along a linear path, rather ebbing and flowing with the collective 
American psyche.  Rising first in the Gilded Age and then again as reactionary 
 
 
23 
 
movements to the social programs coalescing out of presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
New Deal and Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society.      
The impulse to consume, with the exception of specific physiological needs, 
cannot be considered innately biological.  Trachtenberg’s theory of the pedagogy of 
modernity shows how businesses representing mass production imbued Americans with 
the urge for mass consumption (2007:131).  Teaching society how to consume and more 
importantly how these products could improve individual lives.  Those with the ability to 
purchase the products on the showroom floor were purchasing freedom from the 
drudgery of the informal economy of the home.  The pedagogy of modernity in 
contemporary society seems most readily found in a toddler who has consumed too 
many television commercials—they have the ability to tell you exactly what products 
and services they require and how it would improve their lives.      
The local department store contributed to educating the community on the 
rapidly expanding products and services available in the early 20th century.  
Representing the ideal type of home décor, personal style, while reinforcing the social 
norms of communication and etiquette through tea and snack rooms, these 
extravagantly designed places of consumption rapidly became the center of activity in 
many cities and towns.  Some department stores even contained satellite post office 
branches.   
Evolving patterns of production, focusing prominently on mass production as 
opposed to specialized production of luxury items for the economic elite’s conspicuous 
consumption, became increasingly prominent as a means to expand potential revenue 
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sources.  The city was “the place where people assembled to labor in production and to 
consume in consumption, that is, the products of their own labor returned to them in 
advertised commodities…,” (Trachtenberg 2007:139).   
Representing a new form of ideological control, products created through the 
factory-based system kept individuals striving for greater consumption.  Recognizing his 
role in this process, Boston Department Store owner Edward Filene set about defining 
his objective to “sell to the masses, all that it employs the masses to create,” (Ewen 
2001:54).  Mass advertising sought to capitalize on the creation of social habits and 
desires, changing individual expectations of beauty and aesthetics.  One early 
advertising specialist describes this theme in their work, “advertising helps to keep the 
masses dissatisfied with their mode of life, dissatisfied with ugly things around them.  
Satisfied customers are not as profitable as discontented ones,” (Ewen 2001:39).  
One of the great political questions Americans have grappled with concerns the 
role of the federal government in the nation’s economic matters.  Confining myself to 
the most recent generation for brevity, this discussion could easily begin much earlier, 
during the rise of industrialization, or even earlier.  Ascending to the Presidency during 
the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan swept into office articulating a platform labeling the 
government as the problem, not the solution to correcting the ills of the American 
economy.  Americans feeling an inability to trust their government arose from learned 
experiences.  Kicking one party out of the White House for embracing a long-term 
entanglement in Vietnam, the leader of the oppositional party would resign in disgrace.  
Returning to the former party the nation became consumed with a hostage crisis, where 
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many Americans believed ineffectual leadership failed to free those in Tehran more 
quickly.   
Introducing this anti-government philosophy en masse to Americans at this 
moment achieved success largely through the experience of contemporary history.   
Using the imagery of the Chicago Welfare Queen who was gaming the social safety net, 
Reagan harnessed blue-collar anger across the country—where many saw themselves as 
working as hard as ever, but failing to gain economic ground.  For all his charisma, 
Reagan had a penchant for avoiding substantial issues in favor of canned themes and 
catch phrases.  The 40th President of the United States will be remembered for his role 
in exchanging the politics of moral concern for that of American celebration (Stone 2012 
and Mills 2008).   
Shifting away from what E.J. Dionne, Jr. referred to as the Long Consensus, or 
the avowed commitment to balancing the free-market system with programs 
combatting the resulting social discomfort of capitalism (2012:7).  Instead Reagan and 
the neo-conservative movement turned the clock back one hundred years in terms of 
economic philosophy, lurching back towards a radical form of individualism unseen 
since the Gilded Age.   
Before ascending to the White House, Reagan’s ideological spirit—the Heroic 
Free Market was already set in motion by corporate advocacy groups.  Penning a 
memorandum to the Chamber of Commerce in 1971, Lewis F. Powell,  a corporate 
lawyer from Richmond, Virginia who sat on the board of Phillip Morris, asserted the 
American economic system was under a broad assault, by “varied and diffused” sources.   
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Arising from “perfectly respectable elements of society,” such as media organizations or 
from the university system, Powell argues these attacks must be countered by 
supporters assuming a more aggressive stance in extolling the values and virtues of the 
free-market.   
One can witness the struggle for ideological control over the media and 
university, prominently displayed in the open.  Manifesting not through force, but rather 
through ideological control which “takes many less total and more mundane forms, 
through the control of information, through the mass media, and through the process of 
socialization,” (Schattsneider 1975:27).  Transitioning cable news into the realm of 
“infotainment,” where the focus lies more on recycling party-sanctioned talking points 
in a method to harden ideological positions rather than a presentation of social events.  
Providing equal time to parties for the expression of talking points, serious members of 
the media accept both sides arguments as fact without little critical questioning.  In 
essence, ceding its critical function of holding those in power accountable and becoming 
a virtual lap dog for the interests of those in power.  In fact, perceived critical 
questioning can lead to blacklisting and specific journalists may lose access as a result of 
perceived slights.   
Arguing the university system resembles a corporate service station, Seybold 
explains, students are no longer encouraged to “think big” and the intellectual mission 
of the university subsequently compromised.  In further developing this idea he 
continues, “instead of leading the fight against the decline of the public sphere and the 
erosion of democracy, universities have accepted the conditions imposed on them by 
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neo-liberalism and have adjusted to the new status quo,” (2014).  For example, by 
purchasing professorships on the free-market, individuals retain some level of control 
over who receives a job offer, and therefore the ideas they may espouse.   
Taking this route, energy mogul Charles Koch gave $1.5 million to the economics 
department at Florida State University and unsurprisingly used this oversight to hire 
professors for a new program who focused on extolling the virtues of the free-market 
(Hundley 2011).  Declaring one document responsible for changing the entire course of 
social and economic policy certainly qualifies as an overstatement or as some might 
label it, a conspiracy theory.  Nonetheless, undeniable and far-reaching, the social 
reverberations of the development of an elite class consciousness surround these ideas.  
Accepting a seat on the bench of the Supreme Court after offered by President Richard 
Nixon, Powell’s philosophy of a strict free market ideology followed him to the bench.  
Serving as a long-term solution for inducing ideological control, shifts on the Supreme 
Court happen slowly as a result of the lifetime appointments.  Following Powell’s 
appointment, a string of cases to enrich the rights of corporations and the power of 
economic elites occurred in two significant, sweeping waves.   
Beginning in 1975, with a unanimous decision in Cort v. Ash, the court held 
corporations possess the constitutional right to fund advertisements against specific 
political candidates.  The next year in Buckley v. Valeo, the Court struck Federal Election 
Commission (FEC) limits on the amount individual political campaigns could spend 
pursuing public office (1976).  Writing the majority opinion in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Belloti, Powell threw out a statute barring banks and corporations from 
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campaign spending on referendum proposals (1978).  Representing the initial 
groundwork for money and wealth as an acceptable vehicle for the application of free 
speech, these cases began chipping away at regulations regarding corporate spending.   
Initiating in the mid-2000s, the second spate of cases continued down the same 
path.  Striking down Vermont’s campaign financing regulations in Randall v. Sorrell, the 
Court referred to the contribution ceiling as miniscule and that the entire process of 
campaigning may become endangered if not removed (2006).  A ban on corporate 
financing for issue-based advocacy leading up to elections, as long as the 
advertisements do not support or denounce a specific candidate was lifted in 2007’s 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) v. Wisconsin’s Right to Life.   
The unraveling of American democracy continues with the case garnering the 
most attention in this series of cases, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 
(FEC),   where the court defined financial contributions to political campaigns as free-
speech protected by the First Amendment and as an association of individuals, 
corporation carry the identical rights as individuals.  Writing the majority opinion, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy explained legislatures had no business attempting to create 
“fairness” and “there is no such thing as too much free speech.”   Dissenting, Justice 
John Paul Stevens claims this decision “threatens to undermine the integrity of elected 
institutions across the Nation.”   
The most recent ruling removes aggregate individual limits on contributions to 
national political parties and political action committees, although individual 
contributions to candidates still remain at $2600 per candidate (McCutcheon, et. al. v. 
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the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 2014).  Remaining somewhat muddled still, 
individuals may participate in candidate fundraising events, paying well over the 
contribution limit just to get in the door in some cases.  Gaining favorable decisions in 
70% of cases they have argued since Roberts and Alito joined the Court in 2006, the 
Chamber of Commerce has been successful in pushing its agenda through the Court, 
where between 2012 and 2014 their winning percentage rose to 80% (Donnelly 2014).   
Allowing greater flexibility for those contributing to the political system 
cultivates a social atmosphere favoring those with the greatest ability to subsidize the 
spread of ideas.  Expanding the free-market system as advocated by Powell and the 
overall celebration of a business-centric culture has resulted in the fire sale of the public 
portfolio.  Outsourcing the responsibility of utility holdings, toll roads, the education 
system, the management of municipal functions, such as parking meter services, aspects 
of the medical system and the social safety net, and even the hiring of corporate 
mercenaries to wage war, may create more private sector jobs, but raise a great number 
of questions concerning the morality of handing these functions off to public industry.   
Writing in 1960, E.E. Schattsneider asked his readers to: 
 
“Imagine a political system in which votes are bought and sold on the  
open-market, a system which it is taken for granted that people will buy  
all the votes that they can afford and use their power to get more money  
in order to buy more votes, so that a single magnate can easily outvote a  
whole city.  Imagine a situation in which elections have become a mere  
formality because one or a few individuals are owners of a controlling  
number of votes.  Suppose that nine-tenths of the communities are  
unable to exert any appreciable influence.  Suppose moreover that the  
minority is entitled to very little information on what is being done.  
This is the way the political system would be like if it were ran like a  
business,” (1975:118).   
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Declaring the United States a Plutonomy, a 2005 internal memo from the management 
team at Citibank, invited the entire company to consider this notion while reflecting on 
the future direction of business decisions.  Defining the political and social world we 
participate, Schattsneider’s words are no longer just a simple exercise in thought—they 
exemplify our world.   
The dissolution of the Long Consensus, in favor of a corporate governing 
philosophy has disproportionately affected economic opportunity within the working 
classes.  Drew DeSilver details the significant depth of wage stagnation for American 
labor: 
“Today’s average hourly wage has just about the same purchasing power 
as it did in 1979, following a long slide in the 1980s and early 1990s and 
bumpy, inconsistent growth since then. In fact, in real terms the average 
wage peaked more than 40 years ago: The $4.03-an-hour rate recorded 
in January 1973 has the same purchasing power as $22.41 would today,” 
(2014). 
 
At the same time, productivity gains by the American worker have skyrocketed.  In the 
40 years between 1973 and 2013, productivity has nearly increased by 75%, while 
compensation has only risen by 9.2% (Cooper and Mishel 2015).  Upon gaining 
momentum as a cultural and ideological force, the entrenchment of the Heroic Free 
Market corresponds with the increasingly opulent demands for the construction of 
sports venues on the public’s dime.   
Professional Sports as a Microcosm of the Heroic Free Market  
A defining characteristic of the sports industry revolves around consumer’s 
natural interest in competition for entertainment.  Extending beyond the games played 
on the field, many fans constantly check smart phones for the latest transactions, 
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scores, and highlights.  My purpose behind detailing the rise of free-market ideology as 
a cohesive cultural force, in the section above, is to provide the context for the social 
and economic conditions which the sports industry exists.  In this section, drawing on 
historical themes, I will provide three specific examples detailing how the sports 
industry receives advantages because of its unique location within American social life—
through the antitrust exemption provided to Major League Baseball (MLB), the non-
profit status provided to many sports leagues, and the lack of fan and community 
oversight on the by-laws governing the organization of sports leagues.     
Establishing a challenge to the professional baseball duopoly of the National and 
American Leagues, the Federal League began play in 1914. Following their first season, 
the Federal League brought suit against the other two leagues for colluding to 
monopolize the industry.  Landing on the docket of Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis, 
he urged the sides to come together on an agreement.  More notable for later accepting 
the newly minted position of Commissioner of Baseball, a result of the 1919 Black Sox 
scandal, Landis became the driving force behind the maintenance on racial segregation.  
Discarding the Reserve Clause, the Federal League established itself as a league where 
players enjoyed much more freedom.  In Major League Baseball (MLB), the Reserve 
Clause binds players to their teams, even after the expiration of their contracts.  
Grabbing player’s attention, a total of 81 of Major League Baseball’s (MLB) players 
changed employers, opting instead to take the field for Federal League teams (Abrams 
1999:307).   
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Following the 1915 season, Major League Baseball (MLB) owners concocted a 
strategy to end the challenge of the Federal League, eventually purchasing four of the 
eight Federal League teams.  Further, allowing two owners to take over struggling Major 
League Baseball (MLB) teams, one team was already under central control of the 
Federal League.  This left just one Federal League owner without a team in Major 
League Baseball (MLB).  The owners of the team on the outside, Baltimore’s Federal 
League franchise sought to purchase a Major League Baseball (MLB) franchise, however, 
he was ultimately blocked by other owners.  Charles Comiskey of the Chicago White Sox 
lacked belief in the city quipping, “Baltimore is a minor league city and not a hell of a 
good one at that,” (Abrams 1999:308).  Filing a Sherman Anti-trust violation, the owners 
of the Baltimore team sued the owners of the National and American Leagues for 
conspiring to monopolize baseball by eliminating the Federal League.  Accepting the 
case in 1922, the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision written by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes.  Holmes referred to baseball games as a “purely state affair” and while 
team employees must cross state lines to labor, this fact “is not enough to change the 
character of the business,” (Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. The National League of 
Baseball Clubs, et al (1922).   
The Supreme Court developed its opinion based on two circumstances.  First, the 
court viewed participating in organized professional baseball not as an act of commerce, 
but rather only an exhibition of skill.  Secondly, the relevant aspects of conducting the 
business of baseball did not occur across state lines, only in the team’s hometown.  
Understanding the growth professional sports would later undergo in the 20th century, 
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these justices could not have even fathomed the social and cultural reach of the product 
we consume today.  This may seem a confusing decision, but both legal scholar 
Nathaniel Grow and current Supreme Court justice Samuel Alito have argued the Court 
made the correct decision and contemporary criticism of the decision misplaced (2014, 
2009).  Grow admits the decision would likely be different if heard by today’s Court, 
citing the widening interpretive expansion of interstate commerce through the Great 
Depression and growth of the sports industry for the potential reverse in thinking 
(2014).      
Nevertheless, the Court passed on opportunities to reverse its decision in 
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc. and in Flood v. Kuhn (1952, and 1971).  In Toolson v. 
New York Yankees, Inc., the Court advised Congress to enact a law overturning the anti-
trust exemption if they saw fit.  Justice Harry Blackmun acknowledged facts no longer 
aligned in such a way to provide this exemption in his opinion in Flood v. Kuhn, but 
failed to overturn it because the Court felt the consequences would be worse than just 
letting the exemption stand.  The business of baseball remains the only industry 
operating under a judicially created exemption to the Sherman Anti-trust Act.  While the 
Supreme Court may have a chance to reconsider this again soon, Economist Roger Noll 
believes that even if the exemption negated, the possibility a legitimate competitor to 
Major League Baseball (MLB) emerging remain very slim (Parker 2015).   
Together these cases illustrate the political system’s ambivalence towards 
correcting this issue and placing a protective bubble around the industry.  Exempting 
Major League Baseball violates the spirit of anti-trust legislation—arising as a method of 
 
 
34 
 
consumer protection from monopolies which have no competition and no reason to 
offer a reasonable exchange rate for their service.  Leaving the exemption in place 
protects those with a profit motive in the industry, not the consumer or the labor 
(Butler 2014).  In fact, eradicating this law would lead to potentially disastrous results 
for Major League Baseball (MLB) owners.  Keeping prospective teams and owners out of 
the league potentially become more challenging.  Collectively blocking the relocation of 
other teams would no longer be possible.  Finally, overturning this decision would nullify 
the Reserve Clause, still in effect for players with less than six years of experience and 
before athletes reach Major League Baseball (MLB), would void prospects associations 
with specific teams.  In this case, choosing to pursue inaction by elected officials reveals 
significant benefits to the industry itself.      
Further assisting the industry, federal tax code provides tax-exempt status to 
many professional sports leagues.  Not applying to specific teams or individuals, only to 
central league offices.  Ten sports organizations with profits exceeding $10 million 
dollars continue to claim this exemption including the National Hockey League (NHL), 
women’s and men’s professional golf (LPGA, PGA), and professional tennis (ATP) (Tracy 
2014).  Support for nullifying this exception has found bi-partisan support, however 
those with teams and associations in their district refuse to support such measures, 
fearing it could be used against them in future re-election bids.  After years of 
pressuring the league to change its 501(c)(6) status from outside groups and advocates, 
the NFL relinquished its non-profit status in 2015.  With Roger Goodell’s salary hovering 
around $35 million per year, ranking his compensation near the top of other executives 
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from other industries, continuing to argue the league deserved this status became 
untenable and frankly, embarrassing (Pinsker 2015).     
The lack of oversight of community oversight on professional leagues provides a 
third asset to the sports industry.  Structuring league by-laws to undercut local control 
over the direction of teams serve to keep communities flexible to owner’s demands.  
Expanding further on this concept in the third chapter, I will illustrate examples of 
communities seeking to gain greater control over “their” teams and facilities.  Lacking 
oversight can potentially have both positive and negative effects.  Removing owner 
Donald Sterling from the Los Angeles Clippers franchise, a positive because of his racism 
and tendency to put out a terrible product, but raises a question of whether the league 
should be able to unwillingly separate an owner from his property.  Further, claiming a 
responsibility to do so, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) determines 
the behavior of student-athletes—much like an employer, but without the 
compensation.  Additionally, many communities may choose to alter offensive team 
names, if citizens or politicians had authority over such matters.   
 
A Recipe for Social Cohesion? 
E.E. Schattsneider, a political scientist, suggests a sociologically interesting 
question while working from the premise that some identifiable factor establishing the 
cohesiveness of communities must exist (1975:23).  Historically, professional sporting 
events bring members of the community together to cheer in common cause.  Evolving 
from a mechanism for entertainment, the production of professional sports grew into a 
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community persona representing the people of their cities.  Living within a specific 
urban community and representing “their” teams signifies a “tie that binds” an 
individual to their community (Trumpbour 2007:315).  When “the team’s performance 
and identity can be expected to play a role in defining it’s fans sense of civic loyalty and 
participation in a community transcending the confines of family, ethnicity, and 
neighborhood,” it is clear the team satisfies an important community function (Spirou 
and Bennett 2003:315).  
Arguing in favor of other individual and community themes in solving this social 
riddle remains possible.  Some may find focusing descriptions of the tie that binds a 
community together as physical landmarks, institutions, elected officials, or public 
spaces.  Some may be seeking a certain geographical location to be close to family.  
Another, possibly more cynical connection, attaches citizens to their community 
through their employment in a given location.  Regardless of these other possibilities, 
suggesting the institution of sports offers a compelling response to the question.   
Representing their sports franchises, sports stars became local celebrities and de 
facto representatives of the team’s city.  Many athletes advertised a wide array of local 
businesses, but Michael Jordan’s high volume national ad campaigns took this 
representation to a new level.  With brands such as Gatorade and Nike Jordan would 
pave the way for Tiger Woods, Peyton Manning, and LeBron James to step into similar 
roles.  Athletes seeking to maximize their financial potential may even consider 
comparing potential marketing opportunities in choosing to labor in different locations.  
Combining community recognition with perceived hard work on the playing field, a 
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relationship develops between fans and players.  Eliciting a similar emotional 
connection, individual sports venues may take on this characteristic through often and 
repeated attendance.  Through their labor, athletes symbolize the sense of connection 
between individuals and their community.  The uniqueness of the sports industry is 
further revealed in a thought by David Morris, “the people of Detroit don’t congregate 
around the television to watch Ford or GM workers build cars; Seattle residents don’t 
watch Microsoft employees design software,” (1998).   
Providing breadth to this camaraderie amongst a sports franchise and their fans, 
Neil de Mausse describes the summers of his youth.  Serving as his introduction to a 
wide swath of society, de Mausse looked on from his outfield bleacher seats with, 
“Latino families, members of the rap group Grandmaster Flash and the 
Furious Five, a Japanese sports reporter who happily gave up her press 
box seat to sit with the real fans, and an elderly cowbell wielding man 
named Ali, who commuted from his native Puerto Rico every baseball 
season to watch his team in action,” (2008, XVI).   
 
Lamenting every Yankees fans worst fear, George Steinbrenner moving the historic 
team out of the Bronx for New Jersey, de Mausse was fearful “that ours could be that 
last generation to share in this sudden camaraderie,” (2008: XIV).   While Steinbrenner’s 
threatening posture turned out baseless in the Yankees, the anxiety de Mausse felt was 
the result of historical evidence.  The fallout from the 1957 East Coast exodus of the 
Giants and Dodgers to San Francisco and Los Angeles still psychologically stung for many 
New Yorkers living through the experience.   
Uprooting a team from the community instantaneously reveals the social 
connection between the community and the teams playing there.  Fearing the loss of 
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the home team damages the overall community psyche.  The feeling of distress 
experienced by de Mausse and every other fan in this position contributes to the 
process of softening the community towards folding to team’s financial demands.  
Responding in desperation, many support measures to publicly fund stadiums.  Failing 
to grasp the staggering economic costs, civic and team loyalty clouds judgement.    
Pondering what fans are owed in return for their allegiance to the game, Dave 
Zirin prepared a response to New York Daily News writer Mike Lupica.  Lupica argued 
that fans “are owed nothing in sports, no matter how much you care.  You are owed 
nothing no matter how much you’ve rooted and no matter how much you have paid.”  
Crafting a strong counterargument for what communities and fans who root for their 
local teams are owed, Zirin writes: 
“I couldn’t disagree more. We are owed plenty by the athletic industrial 
complex. We are owed loyalty. We are owed accessibility. We are owed a  
return on our massive civic investment. And more than anything, we  
should raise our fists to the owner’s box and say that we are owed a little  
bit of goddamn respect. We aren’t owed this respect because it’s the  
human thing to do. We aren’t owed any love because we cheered  
ourselves hoarse and passed the precious rooting tradition down to our  
children. We are owed it because the teams are ours as much as they are  
theirs. Literally. By calling for and receiving public funds, owners have  
sacrificed their moral, if not financial claim of ownership,” (2010: 8). 
 
Becoming part of a team’s identity, geographical location encompasses a significant part 
of a team’s identity, however, the community and the team’s fans do not hold the keys 
to the business.  At any moment, whether on a whim or through careful planning, a 
single individual or family may create an entire city worth of enemies by relocating their 
business.  Accepting capitalism and free-market economics places the creation of 
growth and profits by individuals above the desires of an entire community.   
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Acknowledgement of this process hardly occurs in the structure of the American 
Heroic Free Market.  There is no debate concerning the worthiness of this system for 
governing the professional sports enterprise.  Believing this conversation on 
organizational alternatives essential, I will begin to confront this process in the third 
chapter.   
 
Growth as Social Cohesion 
Many in the community undoubtedly subscribe to the sports as a community tie 
thesis.  An individual’s answer to this question may even potentially suggest their 
economic standing.  However, evidence suggests that the strongest tie that binds the 
community together is sewn by economic class and the ability to invest and create profit 
through the process of centralized, urban growth.  Recently built stadiums distinctly 
reveal divisions of social classes.  As Dinces explains, recent stadium construction 
contains structural design designated with the economic elite in mind, less centered on 
the game playing out on the field and inclusively providing greater opportunity for 
conspicuous consumption (2014). 
The urban place itself is a market commodity, providing wealth and power to 
those who control access and the ability to influence growth activity.  Significant social 
questions with political and economic implications arise concerning the means and 
tactics used for achieving this growth.  “Setting off this chain of phenomenon,” Harvey 
Molotch explains, “constitute the central issue for those serious people who care about 
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their locality and who have the resources to make their caring felt as a political force,” 
(1976:310).    
Interpreting the process of economic growth within the urban setting as an 
agent for community binding sets up the next chapter which explores how accumulated 
social power is applied in the community debate on public funding for sports stadiums.  
This chapter argues the institution of sport and particularly, the professional sports 
industry receives special advantages in the act of completing its day-to-day business.   
Further exacerbating this social malady, the public’s great interest in the game unfolding 
on the field, where cheering as a fan bleeds into individual’s lives and many blindly 
support stadium construction projects without fully considering the cost.  This chapter 
has aimed to begin the process of removing the rose-colored glasses of fandom, so that 
a study on the business of sports may begin.  Overall, this chapter contributes to placing 
the social location of the institution of sports in American society.  
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Ch#2 – The Blueprint for Stadium Construction:  Applying Community Power and 
Attaining Social Control 
 It has been said in criticism that I am too much fascinated by power.   
 This is not really true.  It is intellect that I have been most fascinated by,  
 and power primarily in connection with that.  It is the role of ideas in  
 politics and society, the power of intellect, that most fascinates me as a  
 social analyst and as a cultural critic.       
  —C. Wright Mills (1916-1962) 
 
 Nothing discloses real character like the use of power.  It is easy for the  
 weak to be gentle.  Most people can bear adversity.   But if you wish to  
 know what a man really is, give him power.  This is the supreme test.     
  —Robert Ingersoll (1833-1899)     
 
 The corporate grip on opinion in the United States is one of the Wonders  
 of the World.  No First World country has ever managed to eliminate so  
 entirely from its media all objectivity—must less dissent.           
  —Gore Vidal (1925-2013) 
 
 
Floyd Hunter’s Community Power Structures (1953) and C. Wright Mills’ The 
Power Elite (1956) began the process of identifying and defining the origins of 
community power.  Interviewing members of Atlanta’s elite, ascertaining this status 
through identification from other elites, Hunter found participants believed power to be 
concentrated in the hands of a few top business executives and corporate lawyers.  
Recognizing patterns, Hunter discovered his research subjects living amongst 
themselves in small gated communities, occupying seats on many of the same corporate 
boards, and most wholeheartedly accept the doctrine of constant growth (1953, also 
see Domhoff 2005).  Concluding community power dispersed through overlapping 
cliques of corporate circles, Hunter’s evidence could have lent itself to a more radical 
analysis.  Filling this void, C. Wright Mills defined Hunter’s “overlapping cliques” as a 
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cohesive social class, explaining “they occupy the command posts of the social 
structure, in which they are now centered the effective means of power and wealth…” 
(1956:4).   
Defending the idealistic notion of power as readily attainable by any member of 
society, critics of Hunter and Mills lined up quickly to dispute their claims.  Maintaining 
the governing system open to a wide variety of general interests, residents control the 
outcome of elections and therefore direct subsequent public policy (Hajnal and 
Trountstein 2010).  Leading the charge, political scientist Robert Dahl, referred to 
Hunter’s work as a “morass of ambiguities and unexamined contradictions (1960).  
Publishing Who Governs? in 1961, Dahl studied the town of New Haven, Connecticut, 
arguing power resides in the competitiveness of a two-party system, where local elites 
and business leaders possess only a peripheral level of influence.  Traveling to Atlanta 
on two separate occasions, pluralists studied in Hunter’s wake (Domhoff 2005). 
Attempting to provide counter evidence, both accomplished the opposite, presenting 
evidence strengthening arguments pointing to a society dominated by elite ideas.   
Replicating Hunter’s methodology, M. Kent Jennings reported finding many of 
the same individuals within Atlanta’s elite social circles (1964).  Explaining economic 
growth in Atlanta a direct result of an expansion of the business district into low-income 
minority neighborhoods, Clarence Stone identified these neighborhoods least likely to 
fight against this expansion.  The work of Mills and Hunter, explains Domhoff, “upset 
political scientists to no end…they simply concluded that business dominates local and 
national governments in the United States in a very direct way, and that politics and 
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politicians are secondary because they more or less have to do the bidding off the 
owners and managers of big business,” (2006:1).   
Any functioning pluralistic community power structure would have opposing 
views down party lines by issue.  Generally speaking, only a marginal divide exists 
between American political parties when it comes to supporting growth machine 
politics.  On providing public funds for the construction of sports stadiums, both parties 
push for such action.  Diagraming this phenomenon, de Mausse and Cagan point out, 
“this pattern has been followed in cities large and small, those run by Democrats and 
Republicans, by free spenders and those traditionally stingy about every cent,” 
(2008:63).  However, suggesting this strategy as wrongheaded, President Barack 
Obama’s 2015 budget includes a proposal to end the process of providing tax-free 
bonds to the sports industry (Grabar 2015).    
In recognizing the existence of the small group of individuals with the ability to 
get things done in the community, either through disposable wealth or political ties, 
social researchers can then begin to illustrate how these individuals exercise community 
power.   Analyzing how this small group of individuals focus their efforts fighting for 
stadium construction on the public dime, this chapter will utilize a three-dimensional 
approach to analyzing applied social power in the community.  Accessing each of these 
dimensions reveals additional tactics, working separately and congruently, to gain 
consent for the use of public funding within the construction of contemporary sports 
stadiums.  Through a constantly  multiplying set of cases, occurring in towns and cities 
though out the United States and around the world, this blueprint for eliciting public 
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funding in the name of constructing stadiums has transitioned into normal operating 
procedure of local and state governments.   
 
The First Dimension—Locating the Application of Overt Power 
Defining “this first, one-dimensional view of power involves a focus on behavior 
in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of 
(subjective) interests…” (Lukes 2005:19).  Taking place in this first dimension, a direct 
analysis of the actions and behavior of teams specifically advocating stadium proposals 
with public funding (Appendix E).  Tactics in this dimension specifically aim to gain the 
consent of the community, specifically those who attend sporting events and root for 
the local team.  Those advocating for stadium projects benefit from communities’ caring 
attitude about the local sports franchise and the general economic well-being of their 
city.   
The opening salvo by the pro-stadium construction movement attempts to drum 
up support for a new venue by defining the current facility as obsolete.  While this 
argument takes many forms, the most prolific route presented by teams argues an aging 
facility actively limits potential revenue streams.  Two other common arguments 
presented by teams regarding the obsolescence of an existing stadium include a greater 
demand for luxury seating and insufficient concourse space.  Threatening to move or 
sell his team unless the city agreed to consummate a new arena deal, Miami Heat 
owner Mickey Arison told city officials the Miami Arena limited his revenue streams by 
not having enough luxury seating and opportunities to sell advertising space (Navarro 
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1996).  Arison eventually received a new arena, shuttering a facility only in operation for 
eight years that was built entirely with taxpayer funding.   
While Arison paid the entire cost of the new building, the city of Miami provided 
$38 million worth of land and continues to pay an annual subsidy of $6.5 million to the 
team (Petchetsky 2013).  Arison recently requested the city contribute more, suggesting 
$17 million as more appropriate.  Generously, the team agreed to pay rent when 
building the arena, nonetheless, the agreement grossly skews in favor of the team.  The 
threshold for the city to receive its share of arena profits was surpassed for the first time 
in 2013, a year where his team won the NBA Championship.  The arena revenue totaled 
over $30 million—the city received a check for $257,000, nearly equaling LeBron 
James’s $231,000 per game salary (Hanks 2013).      
While not angling for a new stadium, Indiana Pacers owner Herb Simon utilizes 
the revenue limiting argument when he applied pressure to the city of Indianapolis to 
rework the team’s arena contract (Kravitz, 2009).  This line of thinking would be more 
compelling if backed by hard evidence, but the community remains expected to rely on 
the owner’s financial assessment at face value.  Announcing an inability to raise enough 
revenue to stay in business, one of two realities exists in this situation.  First, to hold on 
to a vanity project which fails to provide a profit, Herb Simon and company show 
terrible business acumen.  More likely, considering evidence of Simon’s executive talent, 
I believe he saw an opening to apply pressure on local political leaders and to increase 
his overall revenue.  When asked about the Pacers (NBA) financial losses, public policy 
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analyst Mark Rosentraub scoffs, "I don't buy it. There are a lot of ways to categorize 
financial losses and gains,” (Schoettle 2009).   
We may refer to another tactic for applying power in the first dimension as the 
psychological “non-threat” threat.  Functioning to increase docility in a specific 
population, a treatment of psychological shock administered to members of the 
community directly from team executives and public officials (Klein 2007).  Convincing 
community members their team could cease to exist in the near future explains why 
some in the community readily agree with team management on the public funding 
issue.   
Accepting this line of thinking implies a whole-hearted acceptance of the notion 
of sports as a “tie that binds” the community together.  When shopping for a new 
home, team owners generally universally accept and apply this tactic.  Supplying 
examples of this tactic should be a simple task, as nearly every case of stadium 
construction where pressure to chip in money is applied to the community.  Taking part 
in public flirtations with the city of San Antonio as a clear message to the politicians and 
community in Oakland, Raiders (NFL) owner Mark Davis will not hesitate to relocate the 
club if the price is right (Florio 2014).  Probably preferring to stay in Oakland, the team 
has legitimate problems with their 50 year-old stadium, including its inability to keep 
sewage underground during moderate rainfall (Durkin 2014).     
 Over the years, a host of potential landing spots for “free-agent” franchises have 
emerged, providing leverage for additional team demands.  NFL teams, including the 
Browns (the first iteration, before moving to Baltimore and becoming the Ravens), 
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Bengals, Seahawks, and Colts have each used the threat of moving to Los Angeles to 
pressure other communities to increase their financial support of these teams.  Coming 
full circle, the Rams and Raiders both seem focused on a return to the City of Angels, 
while San Diego’s Chargers also angle for a new venue.   
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a similar situation occurred in Major League 
Baseball (MLB) where the White Sox, Mariners, and Giants each flirted with St. 
Petersburg, Florida, a city that clumsily built a domed stadium without a primary tenant.  
Gulf Coast business leaders aggressively sought the attention of the White Sox, with the 
city attempting to provide the stadium rent-free for the first ten years if the team failed 
to make a profit.  Additionally, the Florida state legislature showed a willingness to chip-
in $30 million to speed up the construction timeline before the team ultimately secured 
a deal to stay on the south side of Chicago (Spirou and Bennett 2003:69).      
In presenting plans to the public, teams casually suggest the growth potential for 
the areas surrounding stadium construction projects.  Until materializing, assuming 
economic growth will appear exhibits poor decision making.  However, estimated 
financial projections from consultants never frame the issue in this manner.  Generally, 
embellishing their level of control in manufacturing growth through public spending of 
sports stadiums, local political leaders have less control over this process than they 
imply.  This theme confronts Miami officials after investing $120 million building four 
parking garages at the new Marlins Park.  Expecting to cover debt expenses from two 
sources, a flat fee from the team for day use and leasing 8,500 square feet of ground 
level commercial property.   
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Backfiring in their faces, an unfortunate series of events transpired.  The team 
placed such a poor product on the field, the games quickly became sparsely attended 
soon after the excitement of the newness wore off and the city was subsequently 
unable to fill the retail space.  Three separate national chain restaurants abandoned 
plans to open in this space, leaving only a lonely cigar store in the commercial space as 
of May 2013, more than a year after the new venue opened (Byrnes 2013).    
A new tactic gaining momentum and popularity relies on the presentation of a 
visual rendering of how proposed stadiums could look.  Purposely sleek and futuristic, 
creating models such as these allow residents to view the stadium in a more tangible 
light.  Computer generated propaganda generates support from citizens who attend 
events or can imagine themselves attending events at this venue.  Employing this tactic, 
Indianapolis’ minor league soccer franchise, released a computer generated model of 
the soccer-specific facility in hopes of finding support from the state’s legislature and 
citizens, who remained skeptical (Alesia 2015).  While not achieving success in this 
situation, this tactic would contribute in the right situation.  Likewise, employing this 
medium, the Atlanta Falcons released a video of their new stadium.  However, this video 
was released after community funding had already been committed (Brown 2015).  
 
The Second Dimension—Locating the Application of Covert Power 
For critics of Dahl and the pluralists, the driving force behind their objections 
involves action occurring within second dimension of power.  Describing this dimension 
of power, Bachrach and Barutz in their paper “The Two Faces of Power,” instruct 
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researchers to account for the mobilization of bias within community decision making 
(1962).  E.E. Schattsneider makes clear the social positioning, from which this bias 
originates when he remarked, “the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly 
chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent,” (1975:35).  Concerning action generally 
outside the consciousness of the American public, the second dimension of power 
supplements and reinforces action in the first dimension.   
Convincing those holding the levers of governmental power and other 
community elites that specific stadium projects advance the goals of community is the 
central focus of applied power in the second dimension (Appendix E).  Beyond the direct 
action of specific team owners, paying close attention to the peripheral action of 
secondary community actors, including politicians, corporate advocacy organizations, 
local business owners, financial institutions, unions, and members of the media is critical 
for researchers investigating power at this level.  Advocating and escorting public policy 
prescriptions from basic ideas through the process of becoming brick-and-mortar 
reality, stadium proposals need reinforced support from these social positions.    
In general, government officials have little interest becoming associated with the 
process of losing a professional sports franchise to another city.  From their perspective, 
keeping the local team in town is a priority in the formation of their political legacy.   
Memorialized by a plaque adorning the facilities façade, our political leaders generally 
support these projects regardless of the future financial ramifications.  After all, they 
will be long gone before the financial ramifications of their mismanagement become 
widely apparent.    
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Former Indianapolis mayors Richard Luger and William Hudnut took time laying 
the groundwork for the city to transition towards a sports-based economic sector after 
the local manufacturing base began fading.  In terms of what this type of government 
spending accomplishes, Indianapolis can generally claim success.  Hosting the Pan 
American Games, countless NCAA Final Four weekends, and the National Football 
League’s (NFL) Super Bowl, Indianapolis becomes part of the discussion when other 
cities contemplate making similar economic commitments.   
As research showing the economic benefit of this public spending become more 
widely recognized, continuing to claim this strategy becomes more difficult for public 
officials.  As a result, Indianapolis Mayor Greg Ballard decided to go in another direction, 
choosing to emphasize possession of a team as part of the “big-city” image (Cadle, 
Carroll, Medhin, and Pfaff 2013:12).  The consequences to image-based decisions are 
real:  Ballard eliminated arts and tourism grants, reduced public library hours and closed 
public pools, in addition to funneling property tax revenue towards covering budget 
shortfalls (de Mausse 2013).       
Other locations seeking a similar status boost or “big city” appeal have not been 
nearly as lucky.  Choosing to invest heavily in a waterfront sports complex, including a 
minor-league baseball field and multipurpose arena, Stockton, California chose to 
borrow heavily at a time when their finances were already questionable.  During the 
public debate councilman Dr. Harry Nickerson plead for measured, safe stewardship of 
taxpayer funds, reminding his fellow councilman, “the cupboard is bare and you are still 
borrowing millions of dollars (Center for Investigative Reporting ~11:30).  Approving this 
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public policy during the appearance of a healthy economy, right before the stock market 
sank under the weight of the derivatives market in 2007.  Stockton would eventually 
declare civic bankruptcy as a result of poor financial planning (Pieczenik, Ritsher, and 
Madlena, 2013).  
Playing a direct role in applying pressure on local officials to pass such public 
policy, political interest groups seek to play a direct role in applying pressure on local 
governing officials to pass such legislation.  Hiding in plain view, groups advocating for 
growth use their reach to influence public opinion.  Local branches of the Chamber of 
Commerce chapter assume the most public visibility and consequently achieve the most 
success.  Others such as the Club for Growth or libertarian leaning research institutes 
such as The Heritage Foundation and The Cato Institute also contribute to shaping 
beliefs about public policy.   
Continuing to argue stadium construction projects contribute to local growth 
potential, even when a significant majority of academic literature suggests the opposite, 
these organizations push an ethically challenged community agenda in order to make a 
location increasingly friendly to business interests.   Referencing a potential downtown 
soccer stadium, the local Chamber in Washington D.C. argued “the new stadium and 
related developments, benefitting the District far and wide, provide the city an optimal 
minimal risk and maximum return opportunity for those it serves,” (Wingo 2014). 
Expecting taxpayers to pick up about half of the total costs, equaling $150 million, the 
D.C. proposal does not appear to have “minimal risk.”  Possibly appearing an 
insignificant burden in comparison to other stadium projects, we must consider this 
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amount is between two and three times the value of the entire club itself (deMausse 
2014b).    
Luring the Atlanta Braves to the northern suburbs of Cobb County with public 
funding for a new stadium, the county Chamber went beyond basic advocacy.  Many 
within the elected and non-elected government structure of Cobb County, including 
local judges and county commissioners, participate in Chamber activities (Walls 2014).  
One former Cobb County commissioner experiencing this phenomenon first-hand 
explains, “The problem is they control reality for the board of commissioners, and the 
only view the board of commissioners ever gets is the view the Chamber presents. It 
wouldn’t be so bad if there was another viewpoint presented to the county,” (Walls 
2014).    
Although loudly proclaiming opinions through the Chamber’s vast resources, 
other community groups hold influence simultaneously.  Through Jerry Reinsdorf’s 
maneuvering for a new venue for his White Sox (MLB), a group called Save Our Sox 
(SOS) coalesced.  Initially, SOS applied pressure on team and civic leaders to create a 
solution involving their current facilities.  SOS proposed petitioning the federal 
government to designate Comiskey Park as a national historic monument.  However, 
after Reinsdorf’s increasing public flirtations with Florida’s Gulf Coast, the community 
members representing SOS began singing a more desperate tune (Spirou and Bennett 
2003: 68).  This is a textbook example of the psychological non-threat, coercing many of 
the members in the group into complying with Reinsdorf’s demands.  SOS evolved on 
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their position to eventually begin advocating for public funding to ensure their team 
remained on the south side of Chicago.   
Unions may seem to be the opponent of corporate interests, when negotiating 
collective bargaining rights for their members.  However, in the process of stadium 
construction their goals clearly align.  The business of construction profits through the 
ideological adherence to the notion of perpetual growth, when business slows the 
entire business model crumbles.  Thus both contractors and unions apply pressure for 
potential stadium projects.  In reality, caring very little for who foots the bill, those 
employed in the construction business prefer to continue receiving a paycheck.  Large-
scale building projects, such as stadiums, can sustain entire operations for months or 
longer.  In St. Louis, construction unions graciously volunteered to provide an around-
the-clock shop, without overtime benefits, as part of a stadium proposal to assist in 
keeping the Rams from moving to Los Angeles (Hunn 2015b).   
Likely leading the charge on such projects are local financial institutions 
providing financial services for such projects (Delaney and Eckstein 2003: 9).  Providing a 
necessary service, these institutions deserve a profit.  Nevertheless, seeking a higher 
level of scrutiny to protect taxpayers for poor institutional choices should be more of a 
priority for local politicians.  Reclassifying bonds purchased in 2005 and 2007 to build 
Lucas Oil Stadium, the Indiana Finance Authority paid over $70 million to Goldman 
Sachs to secure a fixed interest rate on the remaining debt (Preston 2015).  Originally 
organizing the financial agreement against future interest rate increases, this plan 
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backfired when after the Federal Reserve kept interest rates artificially low after the 
financial collapse of 2007. 
Financing a total of 28 stadium deals, Goldman Sachs kept on staff a go to banker 
just for these situations.  Greg Carey’s job description included specializing in “crafting 
deals that are lucrative for team owners, often at the expense of taxpayers.” (Farrell and 
Martin 2015).  This nagging sense of entitlement to public funds and the reckless 
disregard for the public interest is jaw dropping.  Accumulating $139 billion in total fines 
over just a two year period, Goldman Sachs actions within the industry “are wasteful if 
not fraudulent,” (Zingales 2015:4).        
 
The Third Dimension—Hegemony in Stadium Construction  
The third dimension of power transitions away from the notion of concerted 
action as the only method of applying community power.  Leading Lukes to the 
question, “Why should one exclude the possibility that power may be at work in such a 
way as to secure consent and thus prevent such conflict from arising?” (2005:7).  
Applying power in the first and second dimensions through concerted action contributes 
to power in the third dimension and strengthens ideological control.   
Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony plays a central role in 
developing an understanding of power in this dimension.  Historian Edward P. Morgan 
characterizes this concept as “elite domination of the mass of people, not through 
coercion, but through people’s consent,” (2010:10).  Morgan continues, this “occurs via 
the penetration throughout the culture of an ideology that ‘this is the way things are.’  
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To the point that ‘the way things are’ becomes the way things must (or should) be in the 
popular imagination,” (2010:10).  Lukes cites Perry Anderson’s interpretation of 
Gramsci’s hegemony as a term denoting the ideological subjugation of the working 
class, enabling rule by consent (2005:144).  Former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher’s political rhetoric associated with TINA (there is no alternative) as a defense 
of economic and social policies equals hegemony expressed through the political system 
to limit the debate of political ideas.  Of course, alternatives to any strategy always exist.       
The reviewed literature on stadium construction suggests the social conditions 
relating to the process of providing public funding for stadium construction arching in 
the direction of Gramsci’s sense of hegemony.  Defining The Heroic Free-Market as 
nothing less than a passive revolution—Gramsci demonstrates exercising power relies 
on the strength of ideology, not just the pressure of the bayonet.  Viewing the public 
financing of stadiums as just another aspect of the sports industry, undoubtedly exhibits 
evidence of the existence of hegemony.  Remember, while large-scale public works 
stadium projects for war memorials or international sporting competitions received 
funding, providing tax payer dollars towards nearly every sporting venue constructed is 
a much more recent phenomenon.  Additionally, the cost of producing venues continues 
to trend upwards, while stadium lifespans continue to shrink (Isadore 2014).  Providing 
this level of public funding for the construction of sports stadiums, the average citizens 
has become trained to accept the Ideology of Stadium Construction, with the only 
alternative in the public’s mind revolving around the loss of their team.   
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The most representative feature of power in the third dimension revolves 
around required maintenance which must “be actively constructed and fought for,” 
(Joseph 2005:63).  Each of the actors mentioned throughout this chapter are 
responsible for performing maintenance and actively constructing the Ideology of 
Stadium Construction.  The words and actions of the men occupying the most powerful 
positions document evidence of hegemony in stadium construction.  Speaking to a 
group of Associated Press reporters in late April 2015, National Football League (NFL) 
Commissioner Roger Goodell announced, “I think we’ve been very clear with every 
community, including the L.A. communities, that we want to see real progress.  It has to 
be substantial.  This is not a new issue to any of these communities,” (Miklasz 2015).  
Goodell’s message implies to each of the cities competing in the standoff to house three 
NFL teams that they must produce public funding to pay to play now or risk losing out in 
the long term.   
Taking the lead role in communicating the leagues extortive demands to city 
leaders, NFL Executive Vice President Eric Grubman explains exactly what they must do 
to remain in the league.  With a tone closer to demanding, rather than negotiating with 
the city of St. Louis, Grubman told the city officials a new stadium replacing the 19 year 
old Edward Jones Dome was necessary to continuing the partnership between the city 
and the league.  During this meeting, the NFL executive described the situation as a 
“race” between cities to buy-in (Hunn 2015a).  In meeting with Oakland city officials, 
Grubman scolded local politicians for their inability to create a politically palatable 
method for the taxpayers to pay for a new stadium (Artz 2015).   
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On the notion of an expiration date on a stadiums ability host events, owner of 
the Washington, D.C.-based National Football League (NFL) team, describes the current 
condition of his home stadium as “a great place to feature our home games, but its 17 
years old now.  I think it’s time for us to start looking and we’re doing it,” (Petchetsky 
2014b).  While seeming like the prose of a delusional billionaire, Snyder would not make 
this statement if the public funding precedent did not exist.  Fleshing out the magic in 
the 17th year of the stadium lifecycle which appears to be the moment when owners 
feel comfortable returning to local officials with their extortion routine, Petchetsky 
points to the Carolina Panthers of the National Football League (NFL) who received $200 
million in public dollars to spruce up their 17 year old facility and the Atlanta Falcons 
who began to publicly advocate for the replacement of the Georgia Dome during its 17th 
season (2014b).    
Taking a cue from league central offices, hiring executives to apply pressure on 
cities to invest tax dollars in privately owned sports teams, individual teams are hiring 
executives to serve in the same capacity.  The Detroit Pistons (NBA) recently hired 
former top-tier player agent Arn Tellem as Vice President of Palace Sports and 
Entertainment.  Owner Tom Gores expectation for Tellem revolves around returning to 
downtown Detroit after the team left for the northern suburb of Auburn Hills in 1988 
(Foster 2015).   
With the team owners, industry executives, growth advocates and beneficiaries, 
and local elected officials espousing the Ideology of Stadium Construction, others within 
communities must buy-in to doling out public dollars towards these projects to avoid 
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community dissent gaining traction.  Two statuses provide reinforcement for the 
efficiency of buy-in from community sources exist.  First, arriving to the community in 
the form of social scientists moving outside the academy, performing lucrative 
consulting work readily accepts TINA in the public funding of sports stadiums.  The well-
intentioned intellectual fails to hold a critical lens to the social havoc created by this 
philosophy.  The second source, more visible by the average citizen looking for clarity, 
the fourth estate plays a direct role in applying power through their social positioning.   
 
The Media—Projectionists of Power 
As the only occupation listed in the United States Constitution outside of the 
political apparatus, journalists hold a vital position keeping those occupying the most 
powerful positions honest.  Defining freedom of the press in more complex terms than 
with a simple yes or no response—the depth freedom must be considered as well (Zinn 
1990:210).  Citing government action against Jim Risen of The New York Times, the 
continued effort to prosecute Julian Assange, and journalist attacks in Ferguson, 
Missouri including reporters shot with rubber bullets and pepper spray, the group 
Reporters without Borders ranked the United States 49th worldwide in protecting the 
rights of the press (Greenwald 2015).    
Those seeking to uphold the enormous responsibility of the spirit of a free press 
find themselves the target of state violence.  Interpreting the threat of state force as a 
significant threat to their own personal and professional well-being, most steer clear of 
challenging social conditions.  When the press stops challenging those within the most 
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powerful positions, a critical switch occurs, where the initial spirit of the press turns on 
its head, becoming an organization projecting the economic, social, and political views 
of the powerful.  The relationship between the powerful and those performing the task 
of holding them accountable becomes uncomfortably close.  We see this mingling 
occurring at events such as the White House Correspondents Dinner.  Affiliating with 
powerful people, creating and maintaining personal relationships, will eventually alter 
an individual’s ability to report clearly.   
In exercising the first dimension of power, the media acts in a direct manner, 
laboring to recycle industry talking points presented by team officials.  Moving into the 
second dimension, we must examine the unseen, but closely intertwined relationships 
between the media and local elites.  This closeness may explain the failure of the local 
news media to provide critical insights or delve into why some in the community may 
oppose stadium building projects.  The consolidation in print media has driven an 
increase in cross-market publishing, where a local reporter pens a story published across 
each source owned by their particular company.  A total of 50 media outlets controlled 
90% of all media sources in 1983 in the U.S., revisiting the same 90% share in 2011 
shows a total of 6 media giants have seized control (Lutz 2012).  A continually shrinking 
range of ideas, propelled by a monumental level of contraction in the media industry, 
strengthens power in the 2nd dimension.   
Detroit provides an example where the media clearly projects ideas with a 
distinctly elitist tone.  Less than one month after the city announced its pending 
bankruptcy, Governor Rick Snyder proclaimed the state on the hook for ~$450 million of 
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the estimated $650 million in cost for a new downtown Detroit arena for the National 
Hockey League’s (NHLs) Red Wings.  Providing a forum for pro-growth interests, an 
application of first dimensional power, Detroit Free Press reporter Tom Walsh provides 
journalistic cover for Snyder’s public policy (2012).  Providing a well-reasoned critique of 
stadium-specific public subsidies as controversial when your own city has just declared 
bankruptcy should flow naturally from critical thinkers.   
However, Walsh repeats the talking points of the growth machine—suggesting 
Detroit becoming less of a place if it lost their hockey team, community funding for the 
stadium appears a sound financial deal, and this spending will turn a blighted area into a 
“vibrant, year-round business district.”  Journalism such as this provides an intellectual 
path to reinforcing the Heroic Free Market, celebrating the Americanized version of 
socialized capitalism where profits are privatized and the financial risk is socialized 
across the population.  Implying state funding remains available in developing stadiums, 
regardless of the impact on the economic and physical well-being of the city and its 
residents.   
After declaring bankruptcy, Detroit asked 32,000 public pensioners to voluntarily 
return the benefits they earned.  Concerned the state would take even more if they did 
not comply, the retirees voted for a 4.5% reduction in earned benefits, as well as a 
contracting future cost of living benefits increases (Davey 2014).  However, even before 
the agreement went into effect, this number rose to 6.7% (Cristoff 2015).  At nearly the 
same moment, the city of Detroit was separating some of its most vulnerable citizens 
 
 
61 
 
from a vital resource.  In Detroit, the average water bill is nearly twice the national 
average.   
The city began shutting off water to 12,500 homes, while simultaneously sports 
venues were allowed to rack up significantly higher fees.  Examples include a city-owned 
golf course owing over $400,000, the Red Wing’s Joe Louis Arena owing over $82,000, 
and the Lions Ford Field over $55,000 (Clark 2014).  Struggling to maintain the basic civic 
services, PBS News Hour’s Hari Sreenivasan explains the level of crisis in Detroit, “Forty 
percent of the city’s streetlights don’t work for lack of repair crews.  The average 
response time for the Detroit Police Department to a 911 call is 58 minutes.  And buses 
are constantly late if they come at all…” (2013).  Hardly scratching the surface here, I will 
discuss this case further in the third chapter, illustrating how the city continues to 
practice bad economics in exchange for subsidizing some the country’s wealthiest 
corporations.     
Having a vested interest in creating a social environment where ideas relating to 
the construction of stadiums elicit positive thoughts in the minds of the community, 
members of the local media (and to a lesser extent, the national media), vocalize pro-
development talking points while trivializing concerns.  Contraction in print journalism 
places jobs within the field at a premium—ensuring individuals within these coveted 
positions encourage stadium projects as a measure of ensuring the long-term stability of 
teams within their given location, while also hoping to ensure their own job security.  
Those attempting to challenge such notions will find a difficult and possibly hostile 
working environment.   
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Sports journalists hardly seem as vile as Hunter S. Thompson asserted, calling 
them “a rude and brainless subculture of fascist drunks, a gang of vicious monkeys 
jerking off in a zoo cage…more disgusting by nature than maggots oozing out of the 
carcass of a dead animal,” (Zirin, 2010:5).  Nevertheless, journalists serve the critical 
function of placating elite interests by limiting dissent and recycling pro-growth talking 
points handed down from the growth coalition and by projecting the sports-as-a tie 
community tie thesis.  Because of their great community reach, the corporate-owned 
media machine has the ability to reach more eyes and ears due to ease of access, 
enabling their P.R. machine the ability to achieve greater influence.   
 
Addressing Critiques of Three Dimensional Power   
I will now respond to two criticisms concerning the three dimensional approach 
to power.  While Lukes specifically addresses these critiques in his 2nd edition, for the 
benefit of the reader, I will summarize them here.   Additionally, I will consider how 
these arguments appear when taken in context of providing community funding for 
sports stadiums.   
Arguing power in the third dimension occurs only in extremely rare 
circumstances, James Scott argues the dominated will always take a position of 
resistance under these circumstances (1990).  This line of thinking downplays the 
importance of an individual’s failure to recognize or possess the ability to take action 
against their domination.  Examples of Stockholm Syndrome and other power 
relationships throughout history dispel this notion (e.g. not every slave openly or 
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covertly rebelled against the Southern power structure).  Likewise, not every American 
draftee disagreeing with the war policy in Vietnam burned their draft cards, left for 
Canada, sat in jail, or poignantly discarded their medals of valor in protest.   
Within the Ideology of Stadium Construction very few members of the 
community recognize their own economic domination, as Scott implies, many will 
remain blinded by their deep interest of the product.  For those recognizing the process 
playing out, they may not possess access to the levers of social and political power or 
the ability to speak out against it.  Economic domination, in this sense, does not 
necessarily signify nothing received in return, as this community expense ensures the 
team will remain in the community for the next couple of decades.  Some receive more 
benefit from this community spending than others, including fans of the team and 
individuals in the positions profiled above.  The ultimate goal for those with the most 
social power rests in the ability to successfully control those most disproportionately 
affected by the lack of economic fairness in such public policy to aggressively argue on 
your behalf. 
A second mode of attack originates from theorists arguing willing compliance to 
domination cannot be accomplished through the third dimension of power.  Appendix E 
suggests this is partially accurate—achieving social control cannot develop with power 
exclusively in the third dimension.  Action occurring within the first two dimensions of 
applied power works in tandem to create and reinforce the third dimension.  Lukes cites 
Jon Elster who explains “our minds are playing tricks on us” as a function of what Elster 
calls the “sour grapes mechanism, (2005:124).  Relying on the anecdotal evidence of a 
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child’s fable, Elster weaves a tale about a fox targeting a bunch of grapes.  After a few 
unsuccessful attempts to reach the snack, the fox regrettably concedes.  Sulking away 
the fox begins the process of convincing himself the grapes sour and his attempt to 
retrieve them a fundamentally flawed idea and well, he really didn’t want the grapes 
anyway.  
The obscenely unequal distribution of resources in the United States influences 
critics of this process to continue defining and reporting on these economic 
boondoggles.  These consequences make Elster’s argument offensive to the senses.  
Moving beyond the absurdity of attempting to prove facts about the real social world 
with a contrived fairy tale, those philosophically opposing such public policy waste are 
not jealous or envious of others’ power.  They simply believe this process a tremendous 
waste of community resources, which continues to provide an economy working most 
efficiently for society’s haves, while the have-nots struggle for access to basic human 
rights.       
 
Confronting Ideological Hegemony 
For individuals and communities, the most effective method combating 
ideological hegemony and TINA attitudes towards building sports stadiums begins with 
starting a sustained community discussion concerning alternatives.  Continuous 
engagement of the public with ideas presented in this project has the potential to 
develop a cohesive social movement resisting the misuse of community funding.  An 
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evolution concerning the philosophy on publicly funding stadiums exists through 
questioning the hypocritical nature of the Ideology of Stadium Construction.    
For sociologists, defining social problems such as the one discussed in this 
project serves as an overdue opportunity to re-establish and grow our discipline.  At a 
time when departments face falling budgets, the elimination of entire programs, and 
the general essence of liberal arts and humanities as a course of study under attack, we 
have a responsibility to become more vocal on the substantial social problems of our 
time.  Most importantly, providing the “big ideas” society must accept to approach 
these problems.  The next chapter delves into a discussion of the “big ideas” necessary 
for us to address the Ideology of Stadium Construction.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
Ch#3 – Assessing Current Trends and Presenting the Alternative 
 Power concedes nothing without demand.  It never did and it never will.                          
               —Frederick Douglass (1818-1895) 
 
 I am not a champion of lost causes, I am a champion of causes not yet won.  
  —Norman Thomas (1884-1968)   
 
 The question should be, is it worth trying to do, not can it be done.   
  —Allard Lowenstein (1929-1980) 
 
The problem of self-interest in the act of participating in day-to-day business 
activity pits team owners against the community.  Conceptualizing how the allocation of 
tax dollars for private stadiums appears to the residents of urban neighborhoods, de 
Mausse and Cagan write: 
“Not everyone has fled for the suburbs, and for those left behind— 
historically, minority, working class, poor people—sparkling new stadiums  
and arenas represent both a luxurious form of entertainment and an  
appalling misuse of increasingly rare public funds. Moreover, adding  
egregious insult to injury, in city after city, the new sports facilities are  
often funded by regressive taxes—by flat levies on consumer items that  
never take into account the consumer’s economic status. Those most  
needing scarce urban funds to be directed towards improved schools, 
infrastructure, job opportunities, and the like are footing a  
disproportionately high percentage of the construction bill. Those taxed  
the heaviest are the same abandoned urban residents least likely to be  
able to afford to attend games at the new stadiums,” (2008:148). 
 
With accountability to the community as the central focus, this process reveals an 
increasingly irresponsible act.  Accepting posh handouts from their “home” 
communities with poverty rates hovering at embarrassingly high levels, including 
Indianapolis, Minneapolis, and Miami where poverty rates sit between 20% and 25% 
and Detroit at nearly 40%, defy logic (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).  
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Although some appear particularly awful human beings and community citizens, 
we should resist labeling all owners irresponsible.  While many owners and league 
entities undertake philanthropic efforts to improve the conditions of the community, 
this goodwill gesture should not minimalize the wider damage done by others their 
industry.  Zirin elaborates, “It’s not that all sports owners are venal, snacking on baby 
seal quesadillas with Goldman Sachs executives before going to their publicly financed 
dog-fight.  The issue is that, evil or not, accountability and accessibility do not rank high 
on their to-do lists,” (2010:5).  Demonizing team owners falls short of accomplishing 
anything substantial.  Instead of pointing fingers at those who have seemingly abused 
this process, we must begin to take responsibility of an organizational method and our 
economic system which allows for these economic abuses to occur.   
Beginning the process of bringing to light how the community can attempt to 
hold owners accountable satisfies C. Wright Mills’s call to consider the research 
problem, as well as possible alternatives to the problem (2000:130).  Two basic issues 
exist in grappling with seeking out an alternative, or at very least measured action 
holding individual owner’s accountable to public claims on their economic contribution.  
First and foremost, pursuing action to relieve taxpayers of the conflict arising when 
privately owned teams seek public subsidy.  Focusing on keeping teams rooted within 
their community and eliminating the “free-agent” franchise phenomenon where cities 
are pitted in a literal money-stacking competition against each other comprises the 
second challenge.  Considering the overall body of evidence, questioning whether the 
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current economic arrangement remains suitable for the professional sports industry 
seems appropriate.   
 
Recent Cases – Resistance and its Consequences   
Recent attempts to secure public assistance for stadium construction reveal 
industry and the public sector becoming more sophisticated in their preparation and 
execution of a concerted strategy.  Keeping the public in the dark during negotiations 
has emerged in cases where public dissent appears certain.  In Detroit, many community 
leaders understood a replacement for the aging Joe Louis Arena necessary to satisfy the 
needs and desires of the Red Wings (NHL).  However, with the city facing tough 
decisions related to their upcoming bankruptcy proceedings, the time for development 
investment didn’t seem appropriate.  Announcing the plan to finance 58% of the new 
arena with future tax revenue, neither Michigan Governor Rick Snyder nor Red Wings 
(NHL) officials acknowledged these discussions taking place before a press conference 
announcing a plan had been finalized (Bradley 2014).   
Achieving the same level of secrecy, the Atlanta Braves and Cobb County nearly 
finalized a stadium deal without the public becoming aware (Petchesky 2014a).  By a 
vote of 5-0, Cobb County Commissioners allocated almost $400 million, nearly two-
thirds of the cost of the project.  The team and their partners in the local county 
government took measured steps to quell community dissent.  County commissioners 
did not reveal voting would take place on the project until after 6 PM on the Friday of a 
3-day weekend.  With the vote occurring on the next Tuesday evening, the council 
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buried the story, announcing the plan at a moment when most of the community was 
distracted.   
On the night of the vote, allowing for only 12 public comments, the County 
Commissioners heard arguments only from the perspective of local business.  To fill 
these spots, potential speakers began arriving five hours before the meeting, a very 
questionable proposition for most working people.  After concluding public comments, 
the council held no debate, only a vote (5-0) to consummate the deal. Forcibly removing 
anyone daring to interrupt and voice opposition, Chairman Tim Lee declared the 
agreement “in the best interest” of those in attendance.  Referring to this project as a 
measure of corporate welfare and calling it a “slap in the face” for working people, Rich 
Pellegrino, a representative of Citizens for Governmental Transparency, arrived about 
an hour before the meeting, unable to make his comments publicly (Petchesky 2014a).             
Beginning to see through the smoke and mirrors routine continually 
orchestrated by the forces of growth, greater numbers of elected officials and 
community members express resistance to the Ideology of Stadium Construction.  
Having ceased playing the role of intellectual dupes to the billionaire class and standing 
up to political interest groups expressing no alternatives, some local politicians have 
stepped up.  Anaheim city officials presented a well-reasoned response to the 
executives of their baseball team seeking public assistance.  Anaheim Angels (MLB) 
owner Arthur Moreno proposed a deal to keep his team in the city, signing a new long-
term lease and paying around $150 million out of pocket for upgrades to Angels 
Stadium (Petchesky 2014c).  In exchange, Moreno requested the city transfer ownership 
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of 155 acres of publicly-owned land which currently provides parking space on game 
days. Moreno, a real estate developer, envisioned using the land for a mixed-use 
development around the stadium.   
Seemingly amenable to such an idea, Anaheim Mayor Tom Tait performed due 
diligence in his capacity as a public servant (de Mausse 2014a).  After speaking with 
financial consultants who appraised the land for $225 million, Mayor Tait made a 
reasonable request for the team to re-examine the deal and make an attempt to close 
the observed gap.  Moreno failed to respond to Mayor Tait’s request.  Upset after 
receiving the cold shoulder, Tait took the step of appraising the value of the land 
without Angel Stadium of Anaheim.  The consultants found the land around the stadium 
increasing in value with the stadium removed, ballooning up to $325 million (Marroqiun 
2014).  Much like a petulant spoiled child, Moreno took his ball and went home, refusing 
to continue negotiating with the city.  Soon after, Moreno opened negotiations with 
other Orange County locations.  Claiming he could build a new stadium all on his own, 
Moreno has nevertheless shown his preference for bilking the tax-payer.   
Blindsided by their own state government, city officials in Detroit have sought a 
creative solution to holding team owners accountable for their grandiose promises of 
job creation and new tax revenue (Bradley 2015).  Legally binding documents, known as 
Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs), between a city and business entity place a legal 
guarantee on consultant’s claims during the proposal process.  Communities tired of 
getting burned by unmet, grandiose claims provide an extra layer of protection for 
taxpayers and ensure job placement for inner city and minority residents.   
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The pivotal point in Detroiter’s learning this lesson may have occurred after the 
city supplied Marathon Petroleum a total of $175 million in tax breaks in 2007.  While 
the multinational corporation claimed this would allow them to create jobs, a total of 15 
new jobs in the city, taxpayers provided a nice gift to further the multinational’s profits 
(Guillen 2014).  Hoping to avoid another Marathon-like situation, members of the city 
council asked Illitch to provide a good will gesture and sign a CBA in exchange for gifting 
land to his team for their new arena.  After Illitch declined this request, three members 
of the city council voted against providing his business this massive gift.  Although this 
dissent could not derail the project from moving forward, the process of developing 
alternatives in the minds of local politicians has begun.   
Initial data arising from the use of CBAs in Los Angeles and Pittsburgh illustrates 
the benefits taxpayers receive through these agreements (Bradley 2015).  In LA, the 
Staples Center CBA provides “publicly accessible park space, open space, and 
recreational facilities,” and to “target employment opportunities to residents in the 
vicinity of the Figueroa Corridor; provide permanent affordable housing; provide basic 
services needed by the Figueroa Corridor community; and address issues of traffic, 
parking, and public safety,” (Policy Tools: Community Benefit Agreements and Policies in 
Effect: Staples Center CBA). In Pittsburgh, a 2011 CBA for the Consol Energy Center 
development provided nearly 40% of available jobs for residents living in the low-
income areas surrounding the stadium (Belko 2011).      
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To say the least, business leaders and their advocates hold proliferation of such 
ideas in a deeply negative light.  Rodrick Miller, president of the Detroit Economic 
Growth Corporation situates his defense of the status quo as follows: 
“We know from years of recruiting companies that Detroit still has big  
obstacles to overcome related to costs, image, and workforce to compete 
against other cities and our surrounding suburbs. If we raise the height of  
the barriers with Community Benefits Agreements we will simply have to  
pay more in public incentives to get businesses to jump over them. We  
can’t afford that.  Isn’t it more cost effective to lower those barriers?”   
(Bradley 2015).   
 
This heightened level of fear concerning CBA’s holds is indefensible.  Accountability does 
not equal greater investment from the community.  This strategy has significant 
potential to reign in the extravagant figures casually ballyhooed about by consulting 
firms paid by teams angling for new facilities on the public dole.  Regardless, we must 
consider this step only a half-measure—an insignificant Band-Aid on a bullet wound.  
CBAs certainly provide a small step in the correct direction by attempting to force 
owners to follow through on their economic promises.  Nevertheless, the city remains 
financially liable for guaranteeing the project-related bonds unless noted in specific 
CBAs.   
 
Buy Teams, Not Stadiums 
Neil de Mausse recently penned an article calling for cities to buy teams, not 
stadiums (2014b).  Following this concept has the potential to satisfy the goal for 
creating an alternative to the current organizational structure.  Providing a couple of 
cases with compelling evidence to support his reasoning, de Mausse describes the 
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madness of this type of public expenditure.  While approving subsidies for a $183 million 
soccer stadium, the Washington D.C. City Council could have purchased 60% of the D.C. 
United (MLS) franchise for just $30 million two years ago.  In 2009, Miami spent over 
$800 million to house a baseball team only valued at $277 million.  As de Mausse states, 
“the numbers make your eyes glaze over after a bit, but add them up and you get all 
kinds of crazy.  If the goal of fronting cash for new sports venues is to keep team owners 
from using their monopoly-given right to skip town and leave fans with no one to root 
for, then one workaround is obvious: cut out the middleman, and buy the team,” 
(2014b).   
Legal and ideological hurdles exist to installing any alternative model, as 
suggested in the previous chapters.  The current status of corporate welfare for the 
sports industrial complex provides reason enough to reevaluate supporting such 
organizational structure.  If you buy Dave Zirin’s argument that the community should 
literally receive a return on its investment when some of the richest members of the 
community come to the taxpayers for assistance in running their enterprise then 
suggesting organizational change is warranted (2010:8).  Professional leagues and their 
owners would attempt to repress any advancement of such a system, interpreting this 
as an attack on the system they oversee.    
One moment illustrating such an ideological hurdle occurred after the death of 
San Diego Padres owner and McDonald’s founder Ray Kroc in 1984.  While Joan Kroc 
maintained a keen interest in helping players overcome drug addiction, she possessed 
little interest in the game being played on the field or the tediousness of the day-to-day 
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front office and management activity.  Wanting to focus on her social service 
philanthropy, but having severe apprehension a new owner would uproot the team, 
Joan felt stuck.  This anxiety was rooted in the city nearly losing the team in the mid-
1970s.  This deal was considered so close to becoming finalized, trading card companies 
printed their 1975 editions emblazoned with a generic Washington D.C. label instead of 
featuring the Padres logo (Norris-Tirrell and Schmidt, 2010:97).   
After this momentary community scare, the maestro of the Big Mac stepped in 
to secure the team’s future in San Diego.  Joan Kroc moved to skirt the possibility of new 
owners extricating the team from the community by donating the team to the city, 
including a $100 million trust for future operating costs.  Major League Baseball (MLB) 
and a specifically cohort of National League owners blocked this action and the team 
was sold to a group of business men in 1990 after vowing to keep the team in San Diego.    
Several professional sports teams utilizing alternative ownership structures exist, 
most notably, the National Football League’s (NFL) Green Bay Packers.  While allowing 
the ownership structure of the Packers through a grandfather clause, the National 
Football League’s (NFL) bylaws now prohibit such method.  Article 3.2(a) pertaining to 
league membership reads, “no corporation, association, partnership, or other entity not 
operated for a profit nor any charitable organization or entity not presently a member 
of the League shall be eligible for membership,” (Constitution and Bylaws of the 
National Football League 2006:3).   
Likewise rooting out this potential, the National Basketball Association (NBA) and 
Major League Baseball (MLB) also ban the practice.  The National Basketball Association 
 
 
75 
 
(NBA) reserves the right for the commissioner to reject any organization not headed by 
a single entity (Article 4(b), Constitution and By-Laws of the NBA).  The Major League 
Baseball (MLB) Constitution, as shown blocking the San Diego Padres proposal above, 
includes a clause where three-quarters of team owners must approve a team ownership 
transfer (Article V, Section 2(b)(1), Major League Constitution).    
The Green Bay Packers (NFL) stand alone as the only top-tier professional sports 
team in the United States not owned by a single individual, partnership, or for-profit 
corporation.  This method of organization contributes to the long-term viability of the 
team, continuing to operate in the smallest television market of any top-tier 
professional sports franchise.  The non-profit corporation running the team offers stock 
to their fans and members of the community (Norris-Tirrell and Schmidt 2010).  
Prohibiting transfers and generating no dividends, Packers’ stock exists simply as a 
novelty item or status symbol.  Placing team profits in a trust providing grants to local 
organizations, stadium maintenance, and future renovation projects.  Shareholders elect 
a board of directors and the board of directors appoint a seven member executive 
committee serving as the decision making body for the organization.    
 
The Potential and Peril of Eminent Domain   
League by-laws remain fluid.  A change of course always remains a possibility, 
possibly even a probability if the political will to force such changes becomes palpable.  
Municipalities would need to wait until owners become willing to sell their teams and 
even then, no guarantee exists an owner would accept the public’s bid over that of a 
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private investor.  One legal clause may provide an opportunity for communities.  The 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment allows for the state acquisition of private 
property for public use or benefit in exchange for just compensation of property.  
Eminent domain has been used to justify the seizure of private property to clear land for 
new stadiums (Sibilla 2014, de Mausse and Cagan 2010, de Mausse 2014b).   
More damaging to the collective psyche of the community, involves the loss of 
shared neighborhood landmarks.  Originally opening in 1910 after a tip from Charles 
Comiskey alerted his friend John McCuddy to the location of his new ballpark.  Over the 
years, many fans came to associate the space with attending White Sox games.  The bar 
eventually became so intertwined with the game being played that beginning in the 
1980’s the bar only opened its doors on days where the White Sox played home games.  
Citing a Chicago Sun-Times editorial from 2000, Spirou and Bennett attempt to 
summarize Chicagoans feelings, “Packed with baseball memorabilia, McCuddy’s  was the 
kind of place that stadium designers today try to recreate at the new ballparks around 
the country,” (2003:107).  Standing in the way of progress, McCuddy’s occupied a space 
near third base in the new Comiskey Park.   
Even with a handshake agreement from the city, the bar would not re-open 
(Sirott 2011).  The city offered the owners a vacant building about three blocks from the 
new venue.  The owners did not believe this location satisfied their ideal needs and 
believed the city promised an on-site or across the street location.  The distress in the 
voice of Pat Senese (John McCuddy’s grandson) is clear, “And it’s not the money either,” 
he explains, “I don’t want the money.  It’s the place.  It’s the name that should remain 
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across the street.  Do you just break history off like a stick?  Wash it away?  I want my 
grandchildren to see that sign up there.  That is what I want,” (Spirou and Bennett, 
2003:106).  As Spirou and Bennett concede, the failure to replant McCuddy’s in the 
community, failed to recreate a municipal icon by connecting present to the lore and 
history of the past (2003).    
Distinctions between the potential use of eminent domain for sports teams and 
the use of this clause to clear way for new stadiums need recognition.  When taking an 
individual’s home or business through eminent domain to build stadiums, the advantage 
directs towards the business of sports.  Community benefits to having the new stadium 
exist, however, they come with a lofty price tag and benefits hardly skew egalitarian.  
When a sports team becomes the subject of an eminent domain attempt, sharing the 
value and benefits created by the team rises to top priority, similar to the collective 
supply of other community utilities such as water treatment or electricity service.   
Gaining ideological acceptance of such ideas appears to be a difficult 
proposition.  Despised in conservative circles where individual property rights trump the 
need for public utilities, eminent domain contains an inherent negative connotation.  As 
IIya Somin, a law professor at George Mason University suggests, “the right approach to 
corporate welfare abuse is not to use eminent domain against the property of 
businesses who lobby for it, but to simply refuse to give in to their demand,” (2014).  
Blocking the advancement of corporate welfare seems an acceptable path for 
community activists, but Somin’s strictly legal definition provides little consideration for 
the health of the community, both socially and economic, derived from the presence of 
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a professional sports team.  Additionally, there is no consideration of public officials 
applying their power behind completing such projects.  An outright rejection of using 
eminent domain on professional sports teams signifies a position taken out of willful 
ignorance, as historical trends show teams willing to uproot themselves from their 
“home” communities in search of an immediate and direct financial windfall.   
Those railing against the use of eminent domain cite a 2005 Supreme Court case, 
Kelo v. the City of New London, where the court upheld economic development reason 
for cause enacting eminent domain.  The offensiveness of this case does not arrive from 
the court’s decision, rather the investor’s failure to remain committed to following 
through with the development.  While the 2007 financial crash played a significant role, 
the land still remains fallow nearly 10 years later (Sibilla 2014).  The act of taking the 
Kelo’s property became unnecessary and the dissent over the result warranted.  
Nevertheless, anger directed towards the clause itself seems misdirected and more 
appropriately directed towards the individual investor for failing to produce.  When 
eminent domain serves to benefit the entire community—not just those seeking 
economic development, this method holds great value.   
My hometown, Mooresville, Indiana recently set in motion an eminent domain 
order to gain control over the privately held local water utility.  However, the town 
remains void of wild-eyed communists looking to institute publicly run industry and 
public works programs at every turn.  In fact, Mooresville remains a typical conservative 
Midwestern suburb—with local elections decided during primary season and where 
many residents still fondly remember the day President Reagan visited thirty years ago 
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(Franklin 1985).  The town took action after the Pennsylvania-based American Water 
Works, Co. Inc. failed to promise necessary infrastructure improvements after repeated 
price hikes and the promise of further rate increases to come.  Initially offering the 
company $6.5 million in exchange for the town’s water infrastructure, American Water 
Works rejected the offer (Olsen 2013).  An Indiana jury heard arguments and viewed 
data from both sides before arriving at this figure, eventually placing a $20.3 million 
value on the property.  Even after amassing two years of legal fees, the town balked at 
this figure, eventually dropping their pursuit (Kenney 2014).     
Remaining familiar to sports historians, two cities attempted to eminent domain 
teams in the early 1980s.  With ticket sales falling through the end of the 1970’s and 
early 80’s, Baltimore Colts owner Robert Irsay engaged in very public flirtations with 
Phoenix, Memphis, Los Angeles, Jacksonville, and Indianapolis.  Baltimore officials 
engaged the team in discussions without negotiations progressing.  Feeling backed into 
a corner, Baltimore officials placed an eminent domain request to the state of Maryland.  
This measure easily passed the Maryland Senate by a vote of 38-4 and the governor 
would sign the bill into law soon thereafter.    
Baltimore officials had reason to believe this measure could be successful.  Two 
years previously, the city of Oakland took the same path, attempting to acquire the 
Raiders franchise after team officials signaled a move south to Los Angeles.  The trial 
court found in favor of the team, asserting intangible property could not be condemned 
under the rule of the law.  Reversing the lower court’s decision, the California Supreme 
Court held “providing access to recreation to its residents in the form of spectator 
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sports is an appropriate function of city government,” (Sibilla 2014).  Furthermore, 
intangible property holds no special property differentiating it from other property and 
remains subject to eminent domain laws.  The case was remanded to the lower courts 
without closure, where it would stay until December 1983, after the Colts situation 
resolved itself.     
While eminent domain can influence the dynamics of power in negotiation 
situations, it can also provide negative, unforeseen consequences.  Immediately after 
learning of Baltimore’s plan, Irsay phoned Indianapolis Mayor William Hudnut letting 
him know the move was official and the team and Indianapolis needed to move quickly.  
Immediately dialing his neighbor John B. Smith, Hudnut had received a promise from 
the C.E.O. of Mayflower Transit to assist in getting professional football to Indianapolis.  
Instantly ordering a fleet of trucks in the area towards the Colts headquarters in Owings 
Mills, Maryland, Smith fulfilled his promise.  Irsay hired labor from a fraternity at the 
University of Maryland, paying them to package and load memorabilia and office 
equipment.  Many of these students were sending off the team they rooted for on 
Sunday afternoons (McKenna 2014).   
Concerned the state police would intercept the team’s frenetic escape, Irsay 
instructed truck drivers to follow separate, individualized routes out of Maryland.  When 
the Governor officially signed the bill, nothing of the team remained under his 
jurisdiction.  After a drawn out battle over the rightful “home” of the team, the two 
cities and the team arrived at an agreement to drop litigation (Hudnut 1986).  As part of 
a nine-point plan, the Colts paid nearly half of the legal fees racked up by the City of 
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Baltimore, returned memorabilia to the city of Baltimore, and pledged support to a 
potential expansion franchise in Baltimore.  Like the attempt in Baltimore, the Oakland 
eminent domain case would eventually end in failure, after an appeals court ruled that 
seizing the team would disrupt interstate commerce (de Mausse 2014b).     
While both attempts at utilizing eminent domain taking control of sports 
franchises unsuccessful to date, the potential for success still exists.  As economist Roger 
Noll explains, “Whether eminent domain would work probably varies from state to state 
and from judge to judge,” (de Mausse 2014b).  Pitfalls in this strategy clearly exist, 
nevertheless, turning the other way and refusing to confront this problem as a 
community only continues emboldening brazen oligarchs.  Given the examples 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, a cohesive ideological resistance to funding 
stadium construction is gaining momentum in some areas of the country.   
While the path to confronting The Ideology of Stadium Construction remains 
somewhat vague, the alternative unacceptable course continues exacerbating 
community inequality.   
If eminent domain requests achieve success, the assessment of fair market value 
creates more questions.  How much would a city need to pay to wrest “their” team 
away from the owners?  Would owners receive the value Forbes has attached to their 
franchise?  This seems unlikely considering recent transactions occurring in the sports 
business have eclipsed this number significantly.  Taking a cue from the experience of 
my hometown, how far over value would public officials and their constituents accept 
before finding the costs too astronomical?     
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Unless relinquishing the team remains their choice, owners would argue for 
compensation based on the potential of future profits.  Precedent reinforces this 
argument.  Merging with the National Basketball Association (NBA) in 1976, four teams 
from the American Basketball Association (ABA) were annexed and would begin play the 
following season: the Indiana Pacers, New Jersey Nets, Denver Nuggets, and San 
Antonio Spurs.  However, before the deal could become final, the three remaining 
American Basketball Association (ABA) owners required compensation.  Accepting $3.3 
million cash payments, owners of two teams, the Virginia Squires and the Kentucky 
Colonels, happily moved on from their teams.  The owners of the third team, the Spirits 
of St. Louis presented a little more trouble—wanting to take advantage of what they 
lacked in the now defunct league, lucrative rights to national television contracts.   
Eventually the bean counters and all their men settled on an agreement 
providing Spirits owners Ozzie and Daniel Silna 1/7th of the television contract rights for 
each of the four annexed teams (Sandomir 2012).  Receiving $2.2 million upfront as 
well, this sum pales in comparison to the money gained through this incredible 
foresight.   The contract the Salinas signed lasted into perpetuity.  With the latest 
broadcasting rights deal, the Salnas total take rose to over $300 million (Sandomir 
2014).  Finally voiding the contract in 2014, the National Basketball Association (NBA) 
and its four member teams agreed to pay the Salinas a flat fee of $500 million to end 
the contract.  This example shows enough cash floating around the sports industry to 
please even the greediest of hucksters.   
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Facing an uphill battle through ideological resistance, eminent domain may not 
work as a politically palatable plan of action.  Back in the first chapter I described Ronald 
Reagan’s call to tackle government inefficiency during his political ascendency.  With the 
popularity that follows this sort of ideological thinking, one expects some in the 
community would automatically dismiss the idea of a “government-ran” sports team or 
water company.  Whether or not an eminent domain request achieves success remains 
wholly dependent on specific judges and jurors.  While threatening to use this order 
against an owner, the potential for adverse effects clearly exist, as was the case in 
Baltimore.  Cities have only expressed interest in this measure as a last ditch effort to 
keep the team in town after the team has motioned a departure.  From the data 
considered above, it appears individuals and their small businesses are more at risk for 
eminent domain requests than large or wealthy corporations.   
 
Models of Community Ownership in Professional Sports  
Growing out of the conflict between sports franchises and their “homes” this 
project offers a discussion on potential methods for communities to seize control from 
team owners and their garish demands.  For those arguing for an alternative 
organizational structure, preparing to lead this transition once our communities call for 
such action demands specific organizational models which have received some level of 
stress testing.  In this spirit, a few thoughts on community-based ownership models will 
conclude this chapter.  Three organizational models deserve our attention, including 
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community, fan-owned, and worker-centric models. The central thrust of this discussion 
hinges on providing real-world examples meeting the goals of this project.   
The ideal management structure of a publicly-owned team would look nearly 
identical to teams owned by a single individual or corporation.  While labeling the 
following as alternative organizational structures, team management, along with the 
packaged product, must appear identical to product consumed presently.  Available 
models show teams generally controlled by an appointed board of directors making 
overarching financial decisions, including the appointment of a general manager to 
oversee and make decisions concerning the game being played on the field.  This power 
dichotomy can already be found in most teams and the teams that do not follow this 
general rule, historically, perform poorly over the long term.    
Some diversity in organizing and funding such ownership ventures exist, either 
through the formation of non-profit corporations or as a directly managed branch of the 
local government.  Providing specific funding and organizational models, Appendix F 
shows Minor League Baseball (MiLB) teams operating under such arrangements 
(Dorothy Norris-Tirrell and Susan Tomlinson Schmidt 2010:99).  Non-profit corporations, 
per the U.S. tax code, must hold a specific public or collective good as the focus of their 
mission statement (Norris-Tirrell and Schmidt 2010:100).  With this designated tax 
status, non-profit corporations cannot distribute earnings or profits to their 
shareholders.  After providing for the care and upkeep of the team, staff, and its 
facilities, the organization must reinvest remaining profits back into their community-
based specialized mission statement.   
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Dorothy Norris-Tirrell and Susan Tomlinson Schmidt’s case study on the 
Memphis Redbirds Baseball Foundation provides a clear example of how a team 
organized as a non-profit corporation can benefit the community (2010:102-105).  The 
team’s mission, “baseball is our business, but the community is our bottom line,” is 
rather broad, providing a great deal of discretion as to how profits can be focused 
towards building a better community.  Former President of The Redbirds Foundation 
Dave Chase told researchers that Memphis became “a safer place when our stadium 
lights are on,” (Norris-Tirrell and Schmidt 2010:105).  In addition, funding two programs 
focusing on expanding little league baseball in urban neighborhoods, serving 2,000 area 
youth each year, the programs invests $600,000 back into the community each year.   
Funding of this organizational structure may also take place as part of the local 
governing budget.  In this example, necessary financial backing, including building 
stadiums, would be undertaken as an aspect within the budget of the local governing 
entity.  Teams would exist as just another branch of the local government, such as the 
parks department or the office issuing marriage licenses.  Long-term fiscal responsibility 
in management would lessen the public burden in the production of sports stadiums, as 
well as relieve the tax burden on the residents of the area.  Appointing board members 
to direct the team could occur in any number of ways, including by the city 
manager/mayor, town council, governor, state legislature, or even through a general 
election of local residents.     
However, as I attempted to show in the first chapter, a “government takeover” 
of sports may be less than ideologically palatable.  Even with resistance folding, other 
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hurdles may still block the path within individual cities and states.  For instance, the 
Indiana State Constitution forbids the government from going into debt.  An ambitious 
infrastructure project in the mid-1830s sought to ease travel in the state.  Borrowing 
heavily to finance the project right before the Panic of 1837, the state nearly went 
bankrupt.   More than a decade later, this financial calamity still weighed on delegates 
of the Second Indiana Constitutional Convention, where they voted to add this clause.  
Because of this, attempting to purchase a team or infrastructure requires a present 
surplus.   
Skirting this inconvenient fact, the state created a series of complicated 
relationships between state agencies.  The Indiana Finance Authority and the Indiana 
Stadium & Convention Building Authority, under the umbrella of the non-profit Indiana 
Sports Corporation, created through legislation, remains ultimately responsible for 
performing as a container for the necessary debt in building large-scale spectator sport 
infrastructure.      
Outside of the National Football League’s (NFL’s) Green Bay Packers model, the 
concept of fan-based ownership remains more familiar to fans across the Atlantic 
Ocean.  Responsible for controlling a total of thirty English Football Clubs, fan-owned 
trusts suggests one possible solution (Cahalane 2013).  Accounting for a few historic 
exceptions, in Sweden, Turkey, and Germany majority ownership must remain in the 
hands of clubs fans (Eurosport 2013).  The popularity of fan ownership growing 
throughout Europe results from several instances of foreign owners swooping in for the 
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prestige of owning a sports team (Blickenstaff 2014).  With fans in charge, loyalty to the 
community and a full understanding of team history seems innate.   
Providing an example, Blicketstaff alludes to the deterioration of Portsmouth, a 
once regular Premier League team, now fallen on hard times.  A note to Americans who 
may not completely understand the process of promotion and demotion in the English 
Premier League (EPL), running a team into the ground in English Football elicits much 
greater consequence than within any American sports league.  Shuffling down to the 
league below their current for the following season, teams at the bottom of the table or 
standings receive a demotion to a lower league, where the teams at the top receive a 
promotion to a more competitive league.  Further problems impacting the team’s fan 
base and shrinking local economic impact increase arise with continued futility.  Adding 
his voice to the chorus of thinkers calling out the sickness of privatization within the 
professional sports industry, Blickenstaff argues, “there's something not quite right 
about some guy flying into town and just taking over, not when generations of fans have 
filled the stands and grown to share an identity with the club…These clubs aren't 
playthings for mega-rich citizens of the world. They're community institutions,” (2014).   
Benefitting greatly from the ideas of economist Richard Wolff, this third and final 
model pays greater attention to those laboring in the creation of profit (2012).  Wolff’s 
research on worker self-directed enterprises (WSDEs) describes how the labor used to 
create products holds the potential to take a more central role in conducting the 
administrative matters behind running a business.  In this organizational model, laborers 
collectively, through a democratic process, manage the direction of the company and 
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most critically, the direction of financial surplus.  As laborers, from players, to 
management, to P.R. staff, to ticket takers, to the person selling beer in the aisles, each 
individual would maintain a voice and voting rights in organizational matters.  Shifting 
the focus of an organization from protecting its accumulated capital, to protecting its 
human capital, results in the most significant advantage of the Worker Self-Directed 
Enterprise Model (WSDE) (Barker 2000).  For instance, in a moment of economic 
downturn, the collective group of workers control whether laying-off coworkers or 
reducing salaries holds the most positive way forward for their organization.    
In this model, the players and other employees decide whether a new stadium 
makes sense within the picture of their own personal finances.  Not just theoretical, 
several businesses currently practice this model.  Supporting over 80,000 workers in 
numerous industries, the MONDRAGON Corporation in the Basque Region of Northern 
Spain provides an interesting case.  Finding success closer to home producing 
computerized automation equipment over the past thirty years, Isthmus Engineering 
and Manufacturing in Madison, Wisconsin utilizes a Worker Self-Directed Enterprise 
Model.  Overall, having the potential to provide a more equitable solution, this model 
places those profiting off the current circumstances as responsible for covering the cost 
of workplace maintenance.   
Each of these models provides systemic improvements to the current 
organizational structure.  Nevertheless, considering the evidence introduced throughout 
this project, if all options remain on the table, communities should seek the pursuit of 
what I characterized above as a government-backed and community managed model.  
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The nature of profit motive and self-interest within the sports industry, as a public good 
in which the community remains significantly invested, drives this assertion.  Leaning 
towards this direction primarily because fan and worker owned models, even if run as a 
non-profit, whether by 5 or 500,000 capitalists, does little to shed the community from 
the expectation of providing tax dollars to enhance, remake, or build new teams 
facilities.    
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Epilogue:  On the Purpose of Government and Social Responsibility 
Seeking to broadly define the process by which stadiums transition from ideas to 
reality, this project suggests a wholesale reimagining of the sports industry should 
commence.  A coalition of the most wealthy and powerful members of society rely on 
convincing those economically disadvantaged by such spending to support these 
projects.  Accessing many tactics in the Blueprint for Stadium Construction, the most 
effective maneuvers by proponents rely on the unmeasurable, the pride derived from 
staging a professional team.  These remain the best arguments proponents of this 
process can muster, as financially the Ideology of Stadium Construction wreaks havoc on 
cities.  In many instances, this type of shared investment creates local financial crises, 
leading towards further pushes for austerity or regressive tax increases.  De Mausse and 
Cagan offer the primary question we must all ask ourselves at the conclusion of 
investigating this matter, “who is our government serving and why?” (2008:XII).  
Further investigation defining how this one industry shapes public policy to further its 
own interests should occupy the focus of sociologists concerned with disappearing 
democracy.     
The actions of those advocating, directing, and accepting the Ideology of Stadium 
Construction expresses an attitude of organized irresponsibility.  As C. Wright Mills 
explains, “when irresponsible decisions prevail and values are not proportionally 
distributed, you will find universal deception practiced by and for those who make the 
decisions and who have the most of what values there are to have,” (2007:18).  This 
irresponsibility extends beyond just those holding the power to make publicly funded 
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stadiums a reality.  Those in the middle and working classes, blinded for their love of the 
games playing out on the field serve as intellectual dupes, while the richest Americans 
transfer funds from the community coffers to their private check books.  Regardless of 
the powerless, the structural immorality of funneling public dollars towards private 
stadiums could not stand without the politicians and men of business exuding this 
troubling philosophy.  After all, “political men can grant financial favors only when there 
are economic men ready and willing to take them.  And economic men can seek political 
favors only when there are political agents who can bestow such favors,” (Mills 
2000:346).  Both public and private forces can claim responsibility for fanning the flames 
of this disastrous tire fire.    
The institution of sports and its participants cherish no concept above fairness—
undertaking a great collective effort to maintain a level playing field.  Rigging the game 
to benefit one of the participants jettisons any claim of integrity.  Subsequently, many 
argue for asterisks in the record books next to baseball players testing positive for 
steroids or HGH, demonize Lance Armstrong as a pariah by those who once considered 
him a hero, and many became irritated at Tom Brady for using underinflated footballs in 
an otherwise non-competitive 2015 playoff game.  The notion of maintaining fairness 
runs through the American culture and bleeds into the sports world.  However, the 
reality of the sports industry is quite different than its mythology.  In an industry 
dominated by billionaires and often organized only for their benefit, the public’s interest 
in the sports industry has compromised the overall economic stability of communities 
by maintaining public policy which socializes costs and privatizes profits.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A:  Demolished Stadiums Where Taxpayers Continue to Pay Debt and Debt 
Services 
 
 Yr. 
Open 
Team(s) Orig 
Cost 
Rem 
Debt 
Payoff 
Yr 
Year 
Demo’d 
Giants Stadium 
(Meadowlands, NJ ) 
1976 Giants(NFL), 
Jets (NFL) 
$78M $266M* 2025 2010 
Kingdome  
(Seattle, WA) 
1976 Seahawks (NFL), 
Mariners (MLB), 
Supersonics (NBA) 
$67M $83M 2016 2000 
Hoosier Dome 
(Indianapolis, IN) 
1984 Colts (NFL) $78M $61M 2021 2008 
Veterans Stadium 
(Philadelphia, PA) 
1971 Eagles (NFL), 
Phillies (MLB) 
$60M $.30M 2020 2004 
*Entire Meadowlands Complex.   
Source:  McGinty and Palmer, 2010  
Appendix B:  Abandoned Stadiums Where Taxpayers Continue to Pay Debt and Debt 
Services 
 
 Year 
Open 
Team(s)  Original 
Cost 
Rem Debt Payback 
Year 
Last 
Year* 
Astrodome 
(Houston, TX) 
1965 Oilers 
(NFL), 
Astros 
(MLB) 
$27M $32M 2032 1998 
Civic Arena 
(Pittsburgh, PA) 
1961 Penguins 
(NHL) 
$22M $10M 2019 2010 
Memphis 
Pyramid 
(Memphis, TN) 
1991 Grizzlies 
(NBA) 
$65M $4M 2022 2004 
*Last year for a tenant in one of the “big 4” professional sports.   
Source:  McGinty and Palmer, 2010 
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Appendix C:  Are Taxpayers Responsible for Your NFL Stadium?   
 
 Yr 
Opened/Renovated 
Total Cost ($) Taxpayer % 
Cowboys Stadium1  2009 $1.15B 44% 
Lucas Oil Stadium  2008 $780M 87% 
Soldier Field  2003 $726M 61% 
Invesco Field at Mile High 
Stadium  
2001 $683M 61% 
Paul Brown Stadium  2000 $669M 83% 
Lincoln Financial Field  2003 $588M 35% 
Reliant Stadium2  2002 $526M 61% 
Ford Field  2002 $504M 51% 
University of Phoenix Stadium  2006 $493M 68% 
Cleveland Browns Stadium3  1999 $446M 73% 
Edward Jones Dome**  1995 $431M 100% 
Qwest Field4  2002 $422M 71% 
M&T Bank Stadium  1998 $409M 66% 
LP Field  1999 $378M 76% 
Arrowhead Stadium  1972/2000 $375M 67% 
Georgia Dome**  1992 $364M 93% 
Superdome5**  1975/2006 $353M 100% 
Lambeau Field  1957/2003 $339M 100% 
Oakland Coliseum6**  1966/1996 $314M 91% 
Heinz Field 2001 $312M 84% 
Raymond James Stadium  1998 $240M 100% 
Qualcomm Stadium**  1967 $229M 89% 
Jacksonville Municipal Stadium7  1995 $222M 91% 
Mall of America Field*  1982 $189M 75% 
Ralph Wilson Stadium**  1973/1999 $174M 94% 
Candlestick Park*  1960 $154M 100% 
*No Longer in Use 
**Attempting to Secure Funding for New Stadium or In the Process of Building New 
Stadium 
1. Now AT&T Stadium 
2. Now NRG Stadium 
3. Now First Energy Stadium 
4. Now Century Link Field 
5. Now Mercedes Superdome 
6. Now O.co Coliseum  
7. Now EverBank Field            
Source: McGinty and Palmer, 201 
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Appendix D: Professional Sporting Venues, Opening 2016/17  
 
 Year 
Opens 
Projected 
Cost 
Public Funding (%)  
NFL Vikings1  2016 $1.024B State $348M 
(34%) 
City $150M (15%) 
NBA Kings2 2016 $448M City $255M (57%)  
NFL 
Falcons3  
2017 $1.2B City $200M (17%) Yearly Hotel Tax 
(?%)* 
MLB 
Braves3 
2017 $672M County $300M + Interest (45%)** 
 
*Over the next 30 years, the Falcons will receive 39.3% of the city’s 7 cents for every 
dollar hotel tax for operating costs of the stadium. This total alone could rise to be in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
   
**Debt service for these bonds will originate from new local taxes in Cobb County (a 
northern suburb of Atlanta) including a special services tax, motel tax, and rental car tax.    
Sources: (1) Lillis, 2013, (2) Belden, 2014, (3)Tucker, 2013. 
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Appendix E:  A Three Dimensional Power Model for the Construction of Sports Stadiums  
 
1st Dimension
• Characterized by Overt Action
• Arguing Obsolescence
• Non-threat/Psychological Attack
• Visual Renderings
• Media projects talking points
2nd Dimension
• Characterized by Covert Action
• Activists/Political Interest Groups
• Policy Papers
• Local Growth Coalitions
• Political Candidate Donations
• The Media and the Elite
 
Power Social Control
3rd Dimension
• Characterized by Hegemony
• TINA – There is No Alternative
Community 
Consent
Corporate/
Government
/Elite 
Consent
Application
Application
Application
 
   
 
    
 
 
 
96 
 
Appendix F:  Community Ownership Models 
 
Model Ownership 
Entity 
Funding 
Distinction 
IRS Standing Governance 
Structure 
MILB 
Example 
Local 
Government 
Municipality, 
County, or 
State 
Part of 
Government 
Budget  
Nonregulated 
Body 
Unit within  
Government 
Scranton-
Wilkes 
Barre (PA) 
Yankees  
Non-
profit—Fan 
Owned  
Nonprofit 
Corporation 
Common 
Stock 
Offering  
Not Recognized 
(tax-paying) 
Board of 
directors, 
elected by 
shareholders 
Appleton 
(WI) 
Timber 
Rattlers  
Non-profit 
Government 
Backed  
Nonprofit 
Corporation 
Local 
Government 
Charitable 
Recognition 
(tax exempt) 
Volunteer 
board 
appointed by 
local 
government 
leadership 
Toledo 
(OH) Mud 
Hens 
Non-profit 
Charitable 
Purpose 
Nonprofit 
Corporation 
Private 
Donors 
Charitable 
Recognition 
(tax exempt) 
Volunteer 
board of 
directors, self-
electing 
Memphis 
(TN) 
Redbirds 
Source:  Dorothy Norris-Tirrell and Susan Tomlinson Schmidt 2010: 99 
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December, 2010                                                                                                             GPA: 3.274 
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Work Experience   
 
Ivy Tech Community College, Indianapolis, IN.                                          Aug. 2015 - Current  
Adjunct Professor of Sociology 
       
 
Luther Consulting, Indianapolis, IN                                                             Sept. 2009 - Current                                                                                        
Research Assistant/Instructional Design Association 
 
 
Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN                                                         Jan. 2012 – Dec. 2012 
Department of Sociology Teaching Assistant  
 
 
Indiana University, Indianapolis, IN                                                        June 2008 – Aug. 2009                                                           
Financial Aid Representative 
 
